CCP's 10 Measures Towards Taiwan: Scholar Calls It a Product of Weaponizing Economic and Trade Exchange Policies
Following KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun's visit to China, China announced 10 policy measures for Taiwan. Experts analyze these as the weaponization of economic exchange, pointing out that the proposal for joint use of the Kinmen and Xiamen new airports, in particular, suggests a strategic shift in cross-strait relations and carries national security risks.
📋 Article Processing Timeline
- 📰 Published: April 12, 2026 at 19:34
- 🔍 Collected: April 12, 2026 at 20:00 (26 min after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: April 13, 2026 at 09:20 (13h 20m after Collected)
Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun returned to Taiwan this afternoon after concluding her visit to mainland China. This morning, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee announced 10 policy measures towards Taiwan, including promoting the resumption of pilot independent travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian Province, and promoting the full restoration and normalization of cross-strait direct passenger flights.
Chang Hung-yuan, a professor at the Department of International Trade at Chihlee University of Technology, told the Central News Agency that more than half of these 10 measures were previously implemented but later canceled due to tense cross-strait relations, such as opening direct passenger flights or access measures for agriculture, fishery, and food products. He described it as 'a product of the weaponization of economic and trade exchange policies.'
Tseng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, pointed out in an interview with the Central News Agency that these measures strongly emphasize the establishment of mechanisms and institutionalization, which has been a focus of the CCP's Taiwan policy in recent years. This includes youth exchange mechanisms, construction of deep-sea fishing ports, and film and television, particularly targeting and attracting relatively disadvantaged industries and groups.
Chang Hung-yuan pointed out that a particularly noteworthy measure is the opening of Kinmen to share Xiamen's new airport, which 'perhaps should not be taken lightly.' Behind it lies a strategic shift in the cross-strait relationship, which will involve issues of the median line of the strait and airspace exclusion, as well as flight safety and airspace control. Solving these problems requires government-to-government dialogue and coordination with flight safety organizations.
He said that these conditions are not currently mature, and for China to propose this under such circumstances, 'does the meaning behind this imply the possibility of future official-to-official or semi-official exchanges?' This is worth continued observation.
Tseng Wei-feng mentioned the 'four links' for Kinmen and Matsu (water, electricity, gas, and bridges), stating that the impact of hardware integration is very significant. This move shows that China wants to further strengthen the interdependence of Kinmen and Matsu with Fujian, creating a kind of demonstration zone to show the Taiwanese people that peace is possible and can bring prosperity. Combined with the influence of film, drama, and youth exchanges, the goal may be to enhance Taiwan's national identity with China.
He pointed out that the measure may also involve national security, such as whether it will increase infiltration capabilities or become a bottom-up force compelling the government to change its policies, but the specific impact will not be seen so quickly.
The Mainland Affairs Council stated today that matters involving cross-border infrastructure must have the evaluation and participation of the competent government authorities and formal negotiations between the two governments. Chang Hung-yuan believes that China's purpose is to throw out a political intention. In a situation where the Taiwan government cannot establish formal contact with the mainland authorities, this move may be to create internal contradictions. When there is no water, electricity, or gas, it can highlight that 'it is Taiwan that is not talking.'
Regarding the strengthening of youth exchanges, Chang Hung-yuan stated that this continues the practice of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation, elevating the cross-strait exchange mechanism from a single foundation to the KMT's party central committee, 'which also means a transfer of identity between Ma Ying-jeou and Cheng Li-wun.'
He said that these 10 measures are a response to the main theme of Cheng Li-wun's 'peace journey,' with the most important being the 'normalized communication mechanism between the KMT and the CCP.' 'In other words, is the KMT-CCP Forum to be restarted?' With official and semi-official exchanges between the SEF and ARATS, and the MAC and TAO, all suspended, this is a signal worth paying attention to for easing cross-strait relations or for Taiwan's future diplomatic hedging options. (Editor: Yang Sheng-ju) 1150412
Chang Hung-yuan, a professor at the Department of International Trade at Chihlee University of Technology, told the Central News Agency that more than half of these 10 measures were previously implemented but later canceled due to tense cross-strait relations, such as opening direct passenger flights or access measures for agriculture, fishery, and food products. He described it as 'a product of the weaponization of economic and trade exchange policies.'
Tseng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, pointed out in an interview with the Central News Agency that these measures strongly emphasize the establishment of mechanisms and institutionalization, which has been a focus of the CCP's Taiwan policy in recent years. This includes youth exchange mechanisms, construction of deep-sea fishing ports, and film and television, particularly targeting and attracting relatively disadvantaged industries and groups.
Chang Hung-yuan pointed out that a particularly noteworthy measure is the opening of Kinmen to share Xiamen's new airport, which 'perhaps should not be taken lightly.' Behind it lies a strategic shift in the cross-strait relationship, which will involve issues of the median line of the strait and airspace exclusion, as well as flight safety and airspace control. Solving these problems requires government-to-government dialogue and coordination with flight safety organizations.
He said that these conditions are not currently mature, and for China to propose this under such circumstances, 'does the meaning behind this imply the possibility of future official-to-official or semi-official exchanges?' This is worth continued observation.
Tseng Wei-feng mentioned the 'four links' for Kinmen and Matsu (water, electricity, gas, and bridges), stating that the impact of hardware integration is very significant. This move shows that China wants to further strengthen the interdependence of Kinmen and Matsu with Fujian, creating a kind of demonstration zone to show the Taiwanese people that peace is possible and can bring prosperity. Combined with the influence of film, drama, and youth exchanges, the goal may be to enhance Taiwan's national identity with China.
He pointed out that the measure may also involve national security, such as whether it will increase infiltration capabilities or become a bottom-up force compelling the government to change its policies, but the specific impact will not be seen so quickly.
The Mainland Affairs Council stated today that matters involving cross-border infrastructure must have the evaluation and participation of the competent government authorities and formal negotiations between the two governments. Chang Hung-yuan believes that China's purpose is to throw out a political intention. In a situation where the Taiwan government cannot establish formal contact with the mainland authorities, this move may be to create internal contradictions. When there is no water, electricity, or gas, it can highlight that 'it is Taiwan that is not talking.'
Regarding the strengthening of youth exchanges, Chang Hung-yuan stated that this continues the practice of the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation, elevating the cross-strait exchange mechanism from a single foundation to the KMT's party central committee, 'which also means a transfer of identity between Ma Ying-jeou and Cheng Li-wun.'
He said that these 10 measures are a response to the main theme of Cheng Li-wun's 'peace journey,' with the most important being the 'normalized communication mechanism between the KMT and the CCP.' 'In other words, is the KMT-CCP Forum to be restarted?' With official and semi-official exchanges between the SEF and ARATS, and the MAC and TAO, all suspended, this is a signal worth paying attention to for easing cross-strait relations or for Taiwan's future diplomatic hedging options. (Editor: Yang Sheng-ju) 1150412