China Pushes 10 Measures for Taiwan; Scholar: Political Bypass and Reshaping Dependence
Following a KMT delegation's visit, China announced 10 economic measures for Taiwan. A Taiwanese scholar analyzed this as a "political bypass" strategy, aiming to circumvent Taiwan's sovereign government and reshape dependency through economic incentives tied to political constraints.
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- 📰 Published: April 12, 2026 at 13:37
- 🔍 Collected: April 12, 2026 at 16:29 (2h 52m after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: April 20, 2026 at 01:24 (176h 55m after Collected)
Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun ended her visit to mainland China and returned to Taiwan this afternoon. In the morning, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee announced multiple Taiwan-related policy measures, including promoting the resumption of a pilot program for residents of Shanghai and Fujian Province to travel to Taiwan individually, and pushing for the full normalization of cross-strait passenger flights.
Hong Yao-nan, deputy director of the Center for Cross-Strait Studies at Tamkang University, told the Central News Agency that these measures represent "soft integration" and a "political bypass." Superficially, they are the release of economic dividends; essentially, it is an alternative strategy deployed by Beijing after the suspension of official cross-strait communication, aimed at bypassing sovereign dialogue and reshaping the governance structure.
He said the operational logic is not simply granting individual benefits, "but a systemic penetration project of using the people to urge officials, using economics to promote unification, and using local levels to surround the central government."
Hong pointed out that Beijing now intends to build a usable "quasi-governance channel" outside of Taiwan's existing constitutional framework through regular communication mechanisms with the KMT. He emphasized that this is not merely an exchange, but an extra-institutional process of "politically confirming power."
He stated that Beijing is sending a highly selective signal to Taiwanese society: only political parties that accept specific political preconditions have the ability to solve practical problems. The ultimate result is not only weakening the government's authority but also rewriting the entire concept of "political legitimacy"—making it so that whoever can communicate with Beijing is the one with the capability to govern.
Hong Yao-nan noted that economically, it is moving from market interaction to structural binding. From the "four links" (water, electricity, gas, and bridges) in Kinmen and Matsu, and market access for agricultural products, to shared airports and industrial cooperation, "the policies have transcended simple trade preferences and shifted toward intervention at the infrastructure and institutional levels."
He emphasized that the key this time is not about how many benefits are given, but about "reconstructing dependency." It is not a simple issue of yielding profits, but transforming economic connections into political constraints. It is a "dual design of incentives and constraints"—"superficially, it's a carrot offering convenience, opportunities, and economic dividends; at a deeper level, it's a political fence reshaping the path of governance and the structure of dependency."
Hong concluded that these measures toward Taiwan have three characteristics: sovereignty is bypassed, dependency is deepened, and governance is blurred. In this way, cross-strait relations are no longer diplomatic relations but are absorbed into so-called internal governance.
Hong Yao-nan, deputy director of the Center for Cross-Strait Studies at Tamkang University, told the Central News Agency that these measures represent "soft integration" and a "political bypass." Superficially, they are the release of economic dividends; essentially, it is an alternative strategy deployed by Beijing after the suspension of official cross-strait communication, aimed at bypassing sovereign dialogue and reshaping the governance structure.
He said the operational logic is not simply granting individual benefits, "but a systemic penetration project of using the people to urge officials, using economics to promote unification, and using local levels to surround the central government."
Hong pointed out that Beijing now intends to build a usable "quasi-governance channel" outside of Taiwan's existing constitutional framework through regular communication mechanisms with the KMT. He emphasized that this is not merely an exchange, but an extra-institutional process of "politically confirming power."
He stated that Beijing is sending a highly selective signal to Taiwanese society: only political parties that accept specific political preconditions have the ability to solve practical problems. The ultimate result is not only weakening the government's authority but also rewriting the entire concept of "political legitimacy"—making it so that whoever can communicate with Beijing is the one with the capability to govern.
Hong Yao-nan noted that economically, it is moving from market interaction to structural binding. From the "four links" (water, electricity, gas, and bridges) in Kinmen and Matsu, and market access for agricultural products, to shared airports and industrial cooperation, "the policies have transcended simple trade preferences and shifted toward intervention at the infrastructure and institutional levels."
He emphasized that the key this time is not about how many benefits are given, but about "reconstructing dependency." It is not a simple issue of yielding profits, but transforming economic connections into political constraints. It is a "dual design of incentives and constraints"—"superficially, it's a carrot offering convenience, opportunities, and economic dividends; at a deeper level, it's a political fence reshaping the path of governance and the structure of dependency."
Hong concluded that these measures toward Taiwan have three characteristics: sovereignty is bypassed, dependency is deepened, and governance is blurred. In this way, cross-strait relations are no longer diplomatic relations but are absorbed into so-called internal governance.