AUKUS Submarine Program Vital for Australia's Survival, Anti-Submarine Expert Says: Not a Provocation Against China

(Central News Agency reporter Chiu Teh-chen, Sydney, 16th) Australian defense expert Jennifer Parker stated that amid increasing instability in the Indo-Pacific region and significant threats posed by the Chinese Navy to Australia's maritime supply lines and trade, acquiring nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS program is not about provoking China, but a necessary action for Australia's survival.

Jennifer Parker, a visiting professor of defense and security at the University of Western Australia, who served in the Royal Australian Navy for over 20 years, published an article titled 'Gareth Evans is wrong. AUKUS isn’t about China, but nation’s survival' on the website of The Australian Financial Review. Her article primarily responds to recent criticism by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who labeled the Australia-UK-US security partnership (AUKUS) as a 'mistaken foreign policy.'

On the 11th, Evans appeared at a public hearing hosted by the unofficial 'AUKUS Public Inquiry,' a civil society initiative in Australia, and claimed that the sole purpose of Australia's nuclear-powered submarines would be 'to search for, track, attack, and destroy Chinese submarines in the Western Pacific.' Evans emphasized that this was an 'inevitable conclusion.'

Parker disagrees with Evans' view. She said, 'As a naval strategy expert with 20 years of anti-submarine warfare experience, I find this statement shocking.'

Parker stressed that countering Chinese submarines is by no means the only purpose of Australia's future nuclear-powered submarines. She explained, 'China's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines are a key component of its second-strike nuclear capability. They typically depart from Hainan Island and are widely believed to patrol primarily in the South China Sea. To avoid detection risks, they generally do not leave that area. Their detection and tracking are important U.S. missions and are unlikely to be the primary task of Australia's future submarines.'

Parker pointed out that protecting Australia's vast maritime zones requires submarines with strong stealth capabilities. She said, 'Australia has the world's third-largest maritime zone. Operating across such a vast area is extremely challenging. Therefore, the speed and endurance of nuclear-powered submarines become critically important. A conventional submarine takes about nine days to travel from Sydney to Perth, while a nuclear-powered submarine can complete the journey in roughly half the time and is much harder to detect.'

Parker reminded that the threat posed by the Chinese Navy's task force circumnavigating Australia last year clearly reflects Australia's need for more advanced submarines. She said, 'Unless properly pre-deployed, conventional submarines cannot intercept such (Chinese Navy) movements due to their slower speed.'

Parker also emphasized that the AUKUS submarines are not targeted at China. She said, 'A sound strategy begins with defending a nation's core interests. Australia's efforts to expand its naval capabilities—expanding surface fleets in the 2030s, procuring nuclear-powered submarines, and developing amphibious warfare capabilities—are all responses to a clear reality: one of Australia's most important national interests is protecting maritime trade.'

Parker added that 99% of Australia's imports and exports rely on sea transport, including critical supplies that support national prosperity and security. Therefore, military threats from the sea pose a greater existential risk to Australia than missile or drone attacks.

In conclusion, Parker reminded that since 1942, Australia has never faced a regional military power threatening its maritime supply lines and trade like China today. She believes that protecting Australia's survival interests 'is no longer an optional choice.' (Edited by Chen Cheng-kung) 1150616