Experts Urge Taiwan's Defense Ministry: Do Not Lower Specs for Army Communication Equipment

(Central News Agency, reporter Lin Jinyin, Taipei, 9th) The military's previous procurement project for Army wideband radios was withdrawn after controversy arose over tender documents that included frequency-shifting technology developed 30 to 40 years ago. Multiple experts and scholars on the 9th called on the Ministry of National Defense to avoid "downgrading specifications" in future procurements, to raise the level of technology to meet the military's future plans for joint operations with the US military.

The Taiwan Strategic and Policy Research Association held a press conference at the Legislative Yuan in the morning titled "Maximize Combat Power, Equip the Military with Advanced Communication Equipment." Attending experts and scholars included Chang Kuo-cheng, convener of the National Security Issues group at the Taiwan Strategic and Policy Research Association; Chou Yu-ping, advisory committee member of the Taiwan Thinktank; Lin Chien-cheng, vice chairman of the Taiwan Industry Technology Promotion Association; Ching Yuan-chou, adjunct professor at the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations, Tamkang University; Li Chung-chih, committee member of the Whole Society Resilience Committee of the Taiwan Industrial Disaster Prevention Association; and Ho Cheng-hui, deputy secretary-general of the Taiwan Security Association.

Chou Yu-ping stated that the bidding process for the Army wideband radio procurement has been withdrawn. The original problem was that the Army's tender notice specifically included frequency-shifting in the specifications in addition to frequency-hopping. Frequency-shifting is a technology from about 30 years ago, while frequency-hopping is the system currently used by the military, including the US military. If specifications are still primarily based on frequency-shifting, it effectively means using technology from 30 to 40 years ago.

Chou said frequency-shifting is a function of communication equipment, while frequency-hopping is a capability of combat systems. Frequency-shifting solves the problem of frequency usage, but frequency-hopping solves the problem of battlefield survival. He hopes that in future procurements, the military will not lower specifications but will raise the level, making all procurements more suitable for the military's future plans, including joint operations with the US, and improving communication and connectivity with the US military. This should be the military's future goal.

Lin Chien-cheng explained the difference between frequency-shifting and frequency-hopping. He said frequency-shifting is like moving from one road to another; without frequency-hopping technology, it is easy to be tracked. Frequency-hopping is like changing the driving path on a road 100 or thousands of times per second, making it impossible for the enemy to track, and even if tracked, decryption is still needed.

Lin said the core of modern asymmetric warfare lies in a joint, cross-service, cross-domain operational picture. If Taiwan wants to achieve this strategic goal, communication links with the US military are very important.

Ching Yuan-chou pointed out that we often discuss the US military's will and capability to come to Taiwan's defense, but we overlook what would happen if the US military actually had to defend Taiwan and how the military and US forces would cooperate. If a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait in the future, the CCP's first step will be network and electronic warfare attacks. If all of the military's combat systems cannot withstand the challenges of the CCP's electronic warfare, the entire foundation will be shaken, highlighting the importance of the frequency-hopping system.

Ho Cheng-hui said that in the past, we focused on single platforms and single equipment, but current battlefield experience and future development trends are increasingly moving towards so-called network warfare, a systematic form of warfare. Through distributed connections, the goal is to reduce the situation where command and communication nodes are directly disconnected once destroyed, and to build a resilient communication network through anti-jamming and anti-disconnection methods. (Editor: Huang Kuo-lun) 1150609