Check Point Research Discovers Hidden Outbound Channel in ChatGPT Code Execution Environment
Check Point Research (CPR) has discovered a hidden outbound communication channel within ChatGPT's code execution runtime environment. This vulnerability could have allowed confidential user conversation data to leak to external servers via a single malicious prompt without user notification or approval. OpenAI confirmed that it fully deployed a fix on February 20, 2026, after receiving CPR's report.
📋 Article Processing Timeline
- 📰 Published: April 1, 2026 at 22:00
- 🔍 Collected: April 1, 2026 at 16:47
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: April 21, 2026 at 22:09 (485h 22m after Collected)
Check Point® Software Technologies Ltd. (NASDAQ: CHKP, hereinafter Check Point), a pioneer and global leader in cybersecurity solutions, through its threat intelligence arm, Check Point Research (hereinafter CPR), has announced research findings demonstrating the potential for exploitation of a hidden outbound communication channel found within ChatGPT's code execution runtime environment. This vulnerability could have allowed confidential conversation data to leak to external servers via a single malicious prompt, without any notification or approval from the user. OpenAI, upon receiving a report from CPR, confirmed that a fix was fully deployed on February 20, 2026.
## Key Findings
- CPR discovered that a single malicious prompt could turn a normal ChatGPT session with a user into a clandestine data leakage channel. In addition to sensitive data shared by users, AI-generated summaries and conclusions could also have been exfiltrated.
- Attacks exploiting DNS-based hidden communication channels were able to bypass AI safety measures. It was also possible to execute remote commands within the ChatGPT runtime.
- Incorporating this process into Custom GPTs could have allowed for broader exploitation as a widespread threat, rather than a one-time risk.
Upon receiving information from CPR, OpenAI implemented a fix for this vulnerability (as of February 20, 2026). No actual exploitation has been confirmed.
## Background of the Discovery
AI assistants like ChatGPT are rapidly processing some of the most sensitive data handled by individuals. Users consult AI assistants about symptoms and medical history, upload financial documents, review contract details, and share personal document content. In many cases, these actions are based on the trust that data shared with AI assistants remains securely within the system.
ChatGPT itself explains that external data transmission is restricted, visualized, and managed. Sensitive data was not originally intended to be sent to arbitrary third parties solely due to a prompt request, and direct external access from the code execution environment was supposed to be restricted. What CPR discovered was a path that bypassed this model.
## A Single Malicious Prompt Could Lead to Covert Data Leakage
CPR discovered that a single malicious prompt could turn a normal ChatGPT conversation into a hidden leakage channel. In this case, once triggered, specific content within the conversation, such as user messages, uploaded files, and AI-generated summaries, could have been sent externally without any warning or approval.
Image 1: An attempt to connect to the external internet from inside the container was blocked.
## Key Findings
- CPR discovered that a single malicious prompt could turn a normal ChatGPT session with a user into a clandestine data leakage channel. In addition to sensitive data shared by users, AI-generated summaries and conclusions could also have been exfiltrated.
- Attacks exploiting DNS-based hidden communication channels were able to bypass AI safety measures. It was also possible to execute remote commands within the ChatGPT runtime.
- Incorporating this process into Custom GPTs could have allowed for broader exploitation as a widespread threat, rather than a one-time risk.
Upon receiving information from CPR, OpenAI implemented a fix for this vulnerability (as of February 20, 2026). No actual exploitation has been confirmed.
## Background of the Discovery
AI assistants like ChatGPT are rapidly processing some of the most sensitive data handled by individuals. Users consult AI assistants about symptoms and medical history, upload financial documents, review contract details, and share personal document content. In many cases, these actions are based on the trust that data shared with AI assistants remains securely within the system.
ChatGPT itself explains that external data transmission is restricted, visualized, and managed. Sensitive data was not originally intended to be sent to arbitrary third parties solely due to a prompt request, and direct external access from the code execution environment was supposed to be restricted. What CPR discovered was a path that bypassed this model.
## A Single Malicious Prompt Could Lead to Covert Data Leakage
CPR discovered that a single malicious prompt could turn a normal ChatGPT conversation into a hidden leakage channel. In this case, once triggered, specific content within the conversation, such as user messages, uploaded files, and AI-generated summaries, could have been sent externally without any warning or approval.
Image 1: An attempt to connect to the external internet from inside the container was blocked.