Scholars Comment on Zheng-Xi Meeting: Xi Jinping Did Not Mention 'One China,' Tone Was Softer
Kuomintang Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in Beijing. Xi Jinping mentioned the '1992 Consensus' but not 'One China,' adopting a softer tone. Scholars believe this reflects changes in Taiwan's political landscape and China's diplomatic strategy to stabilize its periphery before the US-Iran war. The meeting boosted Cheng Li-wen's personal standing within the party.
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- 📰 Published: April 10, 2026 at 16:35
- 🔍 Collected: April 10, 2026 at 17:00 (25 min after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: April 15, 2026 at 21:45 (124h 45m after Collected)
Kuomintang Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen met with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping at 11 AM today in the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The two shook hands for 14 seconds facing the cameras and then delivered public speeches separately, after which reporters left the venue, and the two sides entered formal talks.
Regarding the content of their public speeches, Wang Hsin-hsien, a distinguished professor at National Chengchi University's Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies and director of the International Relations Center, stated in an interview that Xi Jinping's speech primarily focused on the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, cross-strait family ties, cross-strait exchanges, and cross-strait peace, extending to the century-long changes in the world. There were no major surprises, and the tone was relatively peaceful.
He said that Xi Jinping's basic principles were to promote integration, exchange, and peace. In terms of political positioning, he talked about the 1992 Consensus but not 'One China'; he talked about the Chinese nation but not how to forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation; he also talked about Chinese culture. He analyzed that after stating the basic principles, Xi Jinping also paid attention to the effectiveness of his speech on Taiwan's domestic politics.
Wang Hsin-hsien pointed out that it is noteworthy that the '1992 Consensus' was mentioned this time, but 'One China' was not, which was softer and more positive for the Kuomintang.
As for why the tone was 'softened,' he pointed out two reasons: first, Taiwan's political environment has changed, with the Democratic Progressive Party having governed for three consecutive terms; second, the CCP's current diplomatic strategy is to shape a peaceful and stable surrounding environment before the 'Trump-Xi meeting' to stand on the moral high ground internationally during the US-Iran war.
Wang Hsin-hsien noted that this visit by Cheng Li-wen to China was approved by Xi Jinping, and its strategic considerations included, on one hand, increasing bargaining chips on the Taiwan issue for the 'Trump-Xi meeting,' and on the other hand, the 'Zheng-Xi meeting' serves as a political achievement for Xi Jinping's current term regarding Taiwan, which will "certainly be written into the 21st Party Congress political report."
Wang Hsin-hsien stated that up to the 'Zheng-Xi meeting,' Cheng Li-wen's trip had not made any mistakes and had not incurred any deductions internally in Taiwan. As for whether it added points, he believes that "it's hard to see it adding points for the Kuomintang, but it definitely added points for Cheng Li-wen personally," especially in party leadership. In addition, the main theme of this trip, 'cross-strait peace,' also put some pressure on the Democratic Progressive Party.
Furthermore, besides Xi Jinping, the CCP representatives at the 'Zheng-Xi meeting' included Politburo Standing Committee members Wang Huning and Cai Qi, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao, and National Development and Reform Commission Director Zheng Shanjie. Wang Hsin-hsien found Zheng Shanjie's presence "both surprising and not surprising." Zheng Shanjie has long experience in Fujian, served as deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, and is now the director of the National Development and Reform Commission, responsible for allocating resources, which involves economic and social integration.
Wang Hsin-hsien also discussed Cheng Li-wen's speech at Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, which he believes was largely aimed at the domestic audience and the Democratic Progressive Party, mentioning figures like Chiang Wei-shui and Chang Wo-chun. Another aspect was aimed at Japan, for example, "the wounds inflicted by the great sword of Japanese imperialism have not yet healed." In addition, Cheng Li-wen also mentioned "Taiwanese national liberation," which is relative to Japanese colonization, helping Taiwan achieve national liberation under Japanese colonization. (Editor: Chiu Kuo-chiang) 1150410
Regarding the content of their public speeches, Wang Hsin-hsien, a distinguished professor at National Chengchi University's Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies and director of the International Relations Center, stated in an interview that Xi Jinping's speech primarily focused on the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, cross-strait family ties, cross-strait exchanges, and cross-strait peace, extending to the century-long changes in the world. There were no major surprises, and the tone was relatively peaceful.
He said that Xi Jinping's basic principles were to promote integration, exchange, and peace. In terms of political positioning, he talked about the 1992 Consensus but not 'One China'; he talked about the Chinese nation but not how to forge a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation; he also talked about Chinese culture. He analyzed that after stating the basic principles, Xi Jinping also paid attention to the effectiveness of his speech on Taiwan's domestic politics.
Wang Hsin-hsien pointed out that it is noteworthy that the '1992 Consensus' was mentioned this time, but 'One China' was not, which was softer and more positive for the Kuomintang.
As for why the tone was 'softened,' he pointed out two reasons: first, Taiwan's political environment has changed, with the Democratic Progressive Party having governed for three consecutive terms; second, the CCP's current diplomatic strategy is to shape a peaceful and stable surrounding environment before the 'Trump-Xi meeting' to stand on the moral high ground internationally during the US-Iran war.
Wang Hsin-hsien noted that this visit by Cheng Li-wen to China was approved by Xi Jinping, and its strategic considerations included, on one hand, increasing bargaining chips on the Taiwan issue for the 'Trump-Xi meeting,' and on the other hand, the 'Zheng-Xi meeting' serves as a political achievement for Xi Jinping's current term regarding Taiwan, which will "certainly be written into the 21st Party Congress political report."
Wang Hsin-hsien stated that up to the 'Zheng-Xi meeting,' Cheng Li-wen's trip had not made any mistakes and had not incurred any deductions internally in Taiwan. As for whether it added points, he believes that "it's hard to see it adding points for the Kuomintang, but it definitely added points for Cheng Li-wen personally," especially in party leadership. In addition, the main theme of this trip, 'cross-strait peace,' also put some pressure on the Democratic Progressive Party.
Furthermore, besides Xi Jinping, the CCP representatives at the 'Zheng-Xi meeting' included Politburo Standing Committee members Wang Huning and Cai Qi, Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao, and National Development and Reform Commission Director Zheng Shanjie. Wang Hsin-hsien found Zheng Shanjie's presence "both surprising and not surprising." Zheng Shanjie has long experience in Fujian, served as deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, and is now the director of the National Development and Reform Commission, responsible for allocating resources, which involves economic and social integration.
Wang Hsin-hsien also discussed Cheng Li-wen's speech at Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, which he believes was largely aimed at the domestic audience and the Democratic Progressive Party, mentioning figures like Chiang Wei-shui and Chang Wo-chun. Another aspect was aimed at Japan, for example, "the wounds inflicted by the great sword of Japanese imperialism have not yet healed." In addition, Cheng Li-wen also mentioned "Taiwanese national liberation," which is relative to Japanese colonization, helping Taiwan achieve national liberation under Japanese colonization. (Editor: Chiu Kuo-chiang) 1150410