US-Iran Ceasefire Talks: Egyptian Expert Warns of Most Dangerous Scenario – Unresolved Conflicts
Egyptian expert Abdellatif El-Menawy states that the US-Iran ceasefire agreement has not truly ended the war but merely changed its form. The agreement has structural contradictions, and differing interpretations by the US and Iran lead to dangerous developments. Conflicts are escalating in regions like Lebanon, and the Gulf region is anxious about the agreement.
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- 📰 Published: April 11, 2026 at 09:44
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Abdellatif El-Menawy, Chairman of the Egypt News Center and founder of the Middle East Media Center for Studies, commented in Arab News on the US-Iran ceasefire agreement on the 8th, directly stating that the war has not actually stopped, but merely changed its form.
El-Menawy pointed out that the agreement had multiple structural contradictions from the outset. Both the US and Iran acted from their own perspectives, rather than based on a shared commitment to the agreement itself. The US viewed the agreement as its own military victory, forcing Tehran back to the negotiating table; while Iran believed the agreement showed a shift in the US position, willing to accept terms previously rejected.
El-Menawy believes that this ambiguity in interpretation led to subsequent dangerous developments. The agreement did not end the war, but rather redistributed the battlefield. Although direct confrontation between the US and Iran has eased, conflicts are escalating in other regions, especially Lebanon; and critical infrastructure in the Gulf region continues to be attacked.
All parties to the agreement claim to abide by it, and justify their own breaches by citing the other party's breach or misunderstanding of the agreement's content. El-Menawy directly stated that Israel's claim that the agreement does not include Lebanon is the clearest example of this contradiction. However, El-Menawy also emphasized that the agreement's content did not clearly define the "battlefield."
Another point that cannot be ignored is the anxiety of the Gulf region regarding this agreement. El-Menawy stated that the agreement did not bring "stability" to the Gulf states; on the contrary, this bilateral US-Iran agreement is seen by the Gulf states as sidelining their security interests.
The core of the dispute over this agreement lies in the Strait of Hormuz. El-Menawy pointed out that the Strait of Hormuz is considered a core pillar of the agreement, not only a fuse for escalating US-Iran conflict, but now the strait's status is also part of the negotiation game and a measure of the agreement's ambiguity.
The current situation is full of uncertainty, and El-Menawy predicts that three scenarios may emerge in the short term. The first is gradual containment of the conflict: achieving an informal ceasefire through diplomatic efforts, allowing the situation to gradually de-escalate with limited concessions, but this balance is very fragile. The second is the formation of a long-term but fragile ceasefire: that is, although the formal agreement is effective, local conflicts (such as in Lebanon) will continue. The third is the breakdown of the agreement, with conflict escalating again, and due to the rebound of tensions between the two sides, the next round of confrontation will be more intense.
El-Menawy admitted that among these three scenarios, the most unpredictable is Trump's political decisions, especially his changing policy stances. However, based on the general understanding that the cost of an all-out war is extremely high, at least a certain upper limit can be set for the degree of escalation.
El-Menawy finally analyzed that this agreement is not the end of the conflict, but the beginning of a new phase of conflict. El-Menawy worries that unresolved conflicts that have not been thoroughly ended or clearly concluded are most likely to resurface, and may appear in a more intense form, becoming the most dangerous outcome. (Editor: Wei Shu) 1150411
El-Menawy pointed out that the agreement had multiple structural contradictions from the outset. Both the US and Iran acted from their own perspectives, rather than based on a shared commitment to the agreement itself. The US viewed the agreement as its own military victory, forcing Tehran back to the negotiating table; while Iran believed the agreement showed a shift in the US position, willing to accept terms previously rejected.
El-Menawy believes that this ambiguity in interpretation led to subsequent dangerous developments. The agreement did not end the war, but rather redistributed the battlefield. Although direct confrontation between the US and Iran has eased, conflicts are escalating in other regions, especially Lebanon; and critical infrastructure in the Gulf region continues to be attacked.
All parties to the agreement claim to abide by it, and justify their own breaches by citing the other party's breach or misunderstanding of the agreement's content. El-Menawy directly stated that Israel's claim that the agreement does not include Lebanon is the clearest example of this contradiction. However, El-Menawy also emphasized that the agreement's content did not clearly define the "battlefield."
Another point that cannot be ignored is the anxiety of the Gulf region regarding this agreement. El-Menawy stated that the agreement did not bring "stability" to the Gulf states; on the contrary, this bilateral US-Iran agreement is seen by the Gulf states as sidelining their security interests.
The core of the dispute over this agreement lies in the Strait of Hormuz. El-Menawy pointed out that the Strait of Hormuz is considered a core pillar of the agreement, not only a fuse for escalating US-Iran conflict, but now the strait's status is also part of the negotiation game and a measure of the agreement's ambiguity.
The current situation is full of uncertainty, and El-Menawy predicts that three scenarios may emerge in the short term. The first is gradual containment of the conflict: achieving an informal ceasefire through diplomatic efforts, allowing the situation to gradually de-escalate with limited concessions, but this balance is very fragile. The second is the formation of a long-term but fragile ceasefire: that is, although the formal agreement is effective, local conflicts (such as in Lebanon) will continue. The third is the breakdown of the agreement, with conflict escalating again, and due to the rebound of tensions between the two sides, the next round of confrontation will be more intense.
El-Menawy admitted that among these three scenarios, the most unpredictable is Trump's political decisions, especially his changing policy stances. However, based on the general understanding that the cost of an all-out war is extremely high, at least a certain upper limit can be set for the degree of escalation.
El-Menawy finally analyzed that this agreement is not the end of the conflict, but the beginning of a new phase of conflict. El-Menawy worries that unresolved conflicts that have not been thoroughly ended or clearly concluded are most likely to resurface, and may appear in a more intense form, becoming the most dangerous outcome. (Editor: Wei Shu) 1150411
FAQ
What is the nature of the US-Iran ceasefire agreement?
The agreement has not truly ended the war but merely changed its form, and it contains structural contradictions and differing interpretations.