Cheng Li-wen's visit to China: Scholars say lack of leverage means few expected results
Regarding Cheng Li-wen's visit to China, Professor Wang Hong-jen of National Cheng Kung University noted her statement "1992 Consensus, opposing Taiwan independence," pointing out that if "opposing Taiwan independence" means opposing Taiwan's sovereign independence, then ambiguity disappears. Associate Research Fellow Tseng Wei-feng of National Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations assessed that Cheng's remarks highly echoed the CCP's tone, and due to a lack of bargaining chips, the visit would only yield "vague results" such as economic and trade policies or preferential policies for youth and businesses. Professor Wang warned that this visit could have a "dangerous" impact on the KMT's year-end elections, risking being seen as "hastily unifying."
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- 📰 Published: April 8, 2026 at 19:34
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CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping invited Cheng Li-wen to lead a delegation to visit Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Beijing from the 7th to the 12th. Cheng Li-wen arrived in Shanghai yesterday and immediately transferred to Nanjing, Jiangsu, where she was hosted at a dinner by Song Tao, director of the CCP Central Taiwan Affairs Office. Both sides delivered speeches. This morning, Cheng Li-wen visited Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing to pay respects to the Father of the Nation, Sun Yat-sen, and delivered a public speech.
Regarding observations of Cheng Li-wen's current remarks, Professor Wang Hong-jen of National Cheng Kung University's Department of Political Science stated in an interview with CNA that Cheng Li-wen's speech at the dinner, particularly "1992 Consensus, opposing Taiwan independence," is worth noting. Previously, it was always "1992 Consensus, one China with different interpretations," so the meaning of "opposing Taiwan independence" becomes key. If it means opposing Taiwan's sovereign independence, it implies that Taiwan is part of China, and logically, there will be no room for ambiguity.
Secondly, Wang Hong-jen pointed out that although Cheng Li-wen mentioned "Republic of China" during her visit to the mausoleum, he believes "this version has been communicated with the other side," and its content is highly similar to the statements of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as opposing imperialism and opposing colonialism. In particular, Cheng Li-wen's discourse on the Father of the Nation, Sun Yat-sen, mainly aligns with the CCP's narrative of "the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Fascist War" over the past year, with many points being "exactly the same" as the CCP's rhetoric.
Tseng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at National Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations, stated in an interview with CNA that he believes Cheng Li-wen's remarks are similar to what she has emphasized since becoming party chairman and were likely prepared by herself. These remarks are partly her policy discourse and partly a gesture of goodwill to the CCP to make them more willing to accept her terms.
However, Tseng Wei-feng also pointed out that these remarks "highly echo or resonate with the CCP's rhetoric," indicating that their negotiating positions are on the same line, which is why the CCP is willing to talk to her. As for mentioning the "Republic of China," Tseng Wei-feng believes that for the CCP, the Republic of China has been replaced, and there are many ways to interpret it, so they probably don't mind much.
Regarding the results of this trip, Tseng Wei-feng assessed that Cheng Li-wen lacks sufficient leverage to push Xi Jinping to make commitments such as reducing military activities, and is expected to only bring back "vague results," such as economic and trade policies, and preferential policies for youth and businesses. He said that China's current policy towards Taiwan tends to be unilaterally led, and "letting her meet Xi Jinping is already a great honor."
Wang Hong-jen believes that Cheng Li-wen's main purpose for this trip is to continue the communication channel between the KMT and the other side. The point she wants to "sell" back in Taiwan is not substantive results, but that the KMT or she herself is the only person in Taiwan who can communicate with the other side.
However, Wang Hong-jen believes that Cheng Li-wen's visit this time may have a "more dangerous" impact on the KMT's year-end county and city mayoral elections. Cheng Li-wen visited the other side immediately after more than 100 days in office, especially since she has no experience as an elected official, almost talking to the other side without bargaining chips or accumulated political energy, and without specific things to talk about, just to meet. In this situation, coupled with aligning with the CCP's narrative, the public may feel that she is too "hastily unifying."
Tseng Wei-feng also pointed out that the impact on the year-end elections may be "negative." If no actual results are achieved, it may be manipulated into "selling out Taiwan" or "CCP agent." Even if there are substantive results, good publicity methods are needed to win over the public.
Wang Hong-jen warned that the other side's high-level reception of Cheng Li-wen this time may be a "flattering trap," intending to convey to the international community that there are still voices in Taiwan supporting cross-strait peace talks and that Chinese people resolve Chinese affairs in their own way.
Wang Hong-jen assessed that since the main theme of this trip is a "journey of peace," the Cheng-Xi meeting may publicly discuss party-to-party communication and future cross-strait mutual trust and cooperation, and may also issue a cross-strait peace consensus. As for possible closed-door discussions, they may include the role the KMT can play in arms sales and the layout of the 2028 presidential election. (Editor: Qiu Guojiang) 1150408
Regarding observations of Cheng Li-wen's current remarks, Professor Wang Hong-jen of National Cheng Kung University's Department of Political Science stated in an interview with CNA that Cheng Li-wen's speech at the dinner, particularly "1992 Consensus, opposing Taiwan independence," is worth noting. Previously, it was always "1992 Consensus, one China with different interpretations," so the meaning of "opposing Taiwan independence" becomes key. If it means opposing Taiwan's sovereign independence, it implies that Taiwan is part of China, and logically, there will be no room for ambiguity.
Secondly, Wang Hong-jen pointed out that although Cheng Li-wen mentioned "Republic of China" during her visit to the mausoleum, he believes "this version has been communicated with the other side," and its content is highly similar to the statements of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as opposing imperialism and opposing colonialism. In particular, Cheng Li-wen's discourse on the Father of the Nation, Sun Yat-sen, mainly aligns with the CCP's narrative of "the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Fascist War" over the past year, with many points being "exactly the same" as the CCP's rhetoric.
Tseng Wei-feng, an associate research fellow at National Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations, stated in an interview with CNA that he believes Cheng Li-wen's remarks are similar to what she has emphasized since becoming party chairman and were likely prepared by herself. These remarks are partly her policy discourse and partly a gesture of goodwill to the CCP to make them more willing to accept her terms.
However, Tseng Wei-feng also pointed out that these remarks "highly echo or resonate with the CCP's rhetoric," indicating that their negotiating positions are on the same line, which is why the CCP is willing to talk to her. As for mentioning the "Republic of China," Tseng Wei-feng believes that for the CCP, the Republic of China has been replaced, and there are many ways to interpret it, so they probably don't mind much.
Regarding the results of this trip, Tseng Wei-feng assessed that Cheng Li-wen lacks sufficient leverage to push Xi Jinping to make commitments such as reducing military activities, and is expected to only bring back "vague results," such as economic and trade policies, and preferential policies for youth and businesses. He said that China's current policy towards Taiwan tends to be unilaterally led, and "letting her meet Xi Jinping is already a great honor."
Wang Hong-jen believes that Cheng Li-wen's main purpose for this trip is to continue the communication channel between the KMT and the other side. The point she wants to "sell" back in Taiwan is not substantive results, but that the KMT or she herself is the only person in Taiwan who can communicate with the other side.
However, Wang Hong-jen believes that Cheng Li-wen's visit this time may have a "more dangerous" impact on the KMT's year-end county and city mayoral elections. Cheng Li-wen visited the other side immediately after more than 100 days in office, especially since she has no experience as an elected official, almost talking to the other side without bargaining chips or accumulated political energy, and without specific things to talk about, just to meet. In this situation, coupled with aligning with the CCP's narrative, the public may feel that she is too "hastily unifying."
Tseng Wei-feng also pointed out that the impact on the year-end elections may be "negative." If no actual results are achieved, it may be manipulated into "selling out Taiwan" or "CCP agent." Even if there are substantive results, good publicity methods are needed to win over the public.
Wang Hong-jen warned that the other side's high-level reception of Cheng Li-wen this time may be a "flattering trap," intending to convey to the international community that there are still voices in Taiwan supporting cross-strait peace talks and that Chinese people resolve Chinese affairs in their own way.
Wang Hong-jen assessed that since the main theme of this trip is a "journey of peace," the Cheng-Xi meeting may publicly discuss party-to-party communication and future cross-strait mutual trust and cooperation, and may also issue a cross-strait peace consensus. As for possible closed-door discussions, they may include the role the KMT can play in arms sales and the layout of the 2028 presidential election. (Editor: Qiu Guojiang) 1150408