Oasis Evaluates Voting Results of KADOKAWA's 2026 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders as a Turning Point Towards Thorough Accountability at KADOKAWA

*The approval rate for the reappointment of CEO Takeshi Natsuno as a director was 59.68%, a significant decrease from 90.26% in the previous year, indicating that over 40% of the voting rights exercised at this general meeting of shareholders did not support his reappointment.

*Concurrently, the approval rates for the appointment of Hiroo Ura, Chairman of the Board and Nomination Committee Chairman of KADOKAWA, and Tsuneo Kawakami, an internal director, also remained at low levels, reflecting that shareholder concerns extend beyond Mr. Natsuno to the overall effectiveness, independence, and accountability of the company's board of directors.

*It is extremely regrettable that CEO Natsuno continued to avoid Oasis's questions at this general meeting of shareholders, which once again demonstrates the current management's avoidance of accountability.

*Oasis will continue its engagement with KADOKAWA and its board of directors towards the realization of a "stronger" KADOKAWA.

For details, please visit www.abetterkadokawa.com.

[June 30, 2026: Tokyo] Oasis Management Company Ltd. (hereinafter "Oasis" or "the Company") is the asset management company for a fund that holds approximately 15.25% of the shares of KADOKAWA CORPORATION (Stock Code: 9468 JT) (hereinafter "KADOKAWA" or "the Company"). Today, Oasis issued the following statement regarding the results of KADOKAWA's 2026 Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders (hereinafter "the General Meeting"), held on June 24, 2026.

While Oasis finds the reappointment of CEO Takeshi Natsuno as a director of the Company to be deeply regrettable, we are confident that the voting results at the General Meeting represent a crucial step forward in pursuing accountability from KADOKAWA's board of directors.

At the General Meeting, the approval rate for the reappointment of CEO Natsuno as a director remained at 59.68%, a significant decrease from 90.26% in the previous year. This means that over 40% of the voting rights exercised at the General Meeting did not support his continuation as a director. For the incumbent CEO of a leading listed company in Japan, this is an extremely weak mandate, and it would normally be considered natural for him to resign, recognizing that his continued tenure is no longer tenable, and to pave the way for a succession process to identify and recruit new leadership. The voting results of the General Meeting serve as a clear warning from shareholders that the board of directors cannot overlook, and clearly indicate that a significant number of shareholders share Oasis's concerns regarding KADOKAWA's deteriorating performance, repeated failure to meet management targets, operational deficiencies, weak governance, and lack of accountability under CEO Natsuno's leadership.

Furthermore, the substantial number of abstention votes at the General Meeting should not be overlooked. Oasis analyzes these abstention votes as an indication that dissatisfaction with the current management is not limited to some institutional and individual investors, but also extends to strategic and corporate shareholders who are major shareholders of the Company. The decision not to support the incumbent CEO is an extremely significant decision and a clear statement of intent for such strategic investors. The board of directors must take these results seriously as evidence of a significant decline in confidence in management across KADOKAWA's entire shareholder base.

Moreover, the voting results at the General Meeting sounded an alarm not only for Mr. Natsuno but also for KADOKAWA's entire board of directors. The approval rate for Hiroo Ura, who serves as Chairman of the Board and Nomination Committee Chairman of the Company and also as a special advisor to NTT Corporation, a major shareholder, remained at 75.56%. Additionally, the approval rate for Tsuneo Kawakami, who has served as an internal director of KADOKAWA since 2014, also remained at a low level of 77.86%. Oasis believes that these results reflect that shareholder concerns extend beyond Mr. Natsuno's leadership to the broader effectiveness, independence, and accountability of KADOKAWA's board of directors as a whole.

In addition, Oasis is deeply disappointed with the conduct of the General Meeting itself. Generally, an ordinary general meeting of shareholders is intended to be a formal, once-a-year opportunity for shareholders to engage directly with the entire board of directors. Therefore, particularly for a listed company, sufficient time must be allocated to ensure that all shareholders are given a fair and equal opportunity to ask questions of the board of directors, who are entrusted with corporate oversight. However, at the General Meeting, a majority of KADOKAWA's outside directors participated remotely and only appeared briefly at the beginning of the meeting. Furthermore, Mr. Natsuno, who chaired the General Meeting, did not provide Oasis with an opportunity to ask questions until the very end, despite Oasis, KADOKAWA's largest shareholder, repeatedly seeking to ask questions during the Q&A session and raising its hand.

An ordinary general meeting of shareholders of a listed company should be a forum for transparent dialogue and substantive accountability to shareholders, and management's response of avoiding tough questions from major shareholders should not be overlooked. The fact that the Company's board of directors appears to tolerate such conduct raises serious questions about whether KADOKAWA's directors are fulfilling their fiduciary duties to ensure effective oversight and meaningful shareholder engagement.

Following the results of the General Meeting, the board of directors must approach KADOKAWA's management with a greater sense of urgency than ever before and sincerely and directly address the intentions expressed by shareholders through the General Meeting. In particular, given the significant decline in shareholder confidence in the incumbent CEO, the board of directors and the Nomination Committee should immediately reconsider their succession plan, including actively identifying and evaluating internal and external successor candidates.

Furthermore, all directors of KADOKAWA must conduct a far more serious review of the Company's governance, board composition, and management structure, and dedicate significantly more time, attention, and resources to the Company than before. The results of the General Meeting should not be treated as unconditional acceptance by shareholders, but rather as a clear expression of shareholders' desire for prompt accountability and fundamental improvements.

Finally, Oasis sincerely thanks the many shareholders, employees, creators, fans, business partners, and other stakeholders who have understood and supported our efforts towards the realization of a "stronger" KADOKAWA. Oasis believes that despite KADOKAWA being a company with numerous world-class IP assets, its value is still significantly undervalued. To maximize the Company's potential value, management accountability, disciplined corporate governance, reliable execution, and sincere dialogue with shareholders and stakeholders are essential.

Oasis will continue constructive dialogue with KADOKAWA, its board of directors, shareholders, and other stakeholders to support the long-term improvement of KADOKAWA's corporate value. KADOKAWA's board of directors should take the results of this vote as a clear warning that meaningful change is still necessary.

Oasis welcomes all opinions from stakeholders regarding the realization of a "stronger" KADOKAWA at info@abetterkadokawa.com.

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Oasis Management Company Ltd. (hereinafter "Oasis") is an investment fund focused on investment opportunities across a wide range of asset classes in various countries and sectors. Oasis was founded in 2002 by Seth H. Fischer, who currently serves as Chief Investment Officer (CIO). For more information about Oasis, please visit https://oasiscm.com. Oasis complies with the "Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors (Japan's Stewardship Code)" issued by the Financial Services Agency of Japan and conducts monitoring and engagement with investee companies in accordance with these principles.

Oasis does not, in any way, solicit or request shareholders to exercise voting rights jointly with Oasis. Shareholders who have agreed to jointly exercise voting rights are deemed "joint holders" under Japan's substantial shareholding reporting regulations and must file notifications for public inspection regarding their aggregate shareholdings with the relevant Japanese authorities. Oasis does not intend, by the expression of any views or opinions in this document, through engagement with shareholders or other third parties via this document, or in any other publications prepared and/or published by Oasis (whether in writing or orally, and regardless of the medium), to be treated as a "joint holder" and/or "interested party" in relation to other shareholders under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of Japan (the "FIEA"). Oasis does not intend to be authorized to act as an agent for other shareholders regarding their voting rights. This document exclusively expresses Oasis's opinions, interpretations, and estimations. Oasis expresses such opinions solely in its capacity as an investment advisor to the Oasis Funds. Oasis and/or the investment funds advised by Oasis currently hold investments in the companies mentioned herein and may continue to hold such investments in the future. Therefore, the views and opinions expressed herein should not be considered impartial. Nothing in this document should be construed as indicating any present or future intention of Oasis to buy, sell, vote, or otherwise act, and these may be changed at any time.

Nothing in this document, unless otherwise expressly stated, is intended to constitute, nor should it be construed as constituting, a "proposal" as referred to in Article 14-8-2, Paragraph 1 of the Cabinet Order for the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (Cabinet Order No. 321 of 1965), as amended by Cabinet Order No. 247 of 2025, effective July 4, 2025.