Zheng-Xi Meeting Repeatedly Mentions Same Terms; Lo Wen-chia: CCP's Demanding Approach
Lo Wen-chia, Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), criticized the repeated use of specific terms in the meeting between KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen and Chinese President Xi Jinping, calling it a pre-arranged and demanding tactic by the CCP. He linked this to China's new 'Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress' set for July implementation, analyzing the CCP's 'legal, semantic, and narrative warfare' as a 'trinity strategic framework,' urging Taiwan to discern its intentions.
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- 📰 Published: May 11, 2026 at 10:50
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Central News Agency, Taipei, May 11th - Lo Wen-chia, Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), stated in a Facebook post on the 10th that during the April meeting between Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wen and Chinese President Xi Jinping, terms such as 'Chinese people,' 'revitalization of the Chinese nation,' and 'opposing foreign interference' were repeatedly mentioned. He believes this was not spontaneous but a 'pre-arranged' arrangement. He asserted that if one wants to meet Xi Jinping, they must not only comply with all arrangements but also repeatedly utter the same words, characterizing this as the 'typical demanding approach of the Communist Party, acting from a high position.'
Lo Wen-chia published a lengthy comment on Facebook titled 'You think it's à la carte, but it's actually a set menu—Viewing the CCP's Identity Engineering on Taiwan from Xi Jinping's Meeting with Cheng Li-wen.'
In his article, he particularly emphasized that China's 'Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress' is slated to be implemented on July 1st. This is a legalized political and social engineering project carefully planned by the CCP over two years to consolidate border regions and stabilize its regime. It is not only used against Taiwan but also against ethnic minorities within and outside China, including Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Mongolians.
He noted that although the CCP passed the 'Anti-Secession Law' in 2005, providing a legal basis for military action against Taiwan, and has conducted continuous grey-zone military exercises and intimidation since 2022, public opinion within Taiwan and the international community's response, which supports Taiwan and opposes China, has grown stronger and shown no signs of diminishing.
He then stated, 'What can't be achieved by force, achieve by soft means; what can't be attacked externally, crumble from within.' This reflects the Communist Party's flexibility, and the 'Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress' is the culmination of this strategic and tactical guidance.
He said that after this law was passed in March and before its implementation in July, the new leadership of the Kuomintang serves as the best cooperative model.
Lo Wen-chia remarked that this law is worth Taiwan's attention, first for its 'legal warfare.' In the past, 'splitting the country is not allowed,' with military suppression if necessary, which was the 'Anti-Secession Law'; now, 'splitting the nation is not allowed,' with immediate criminal penalties, which is the 'Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress.' Coupled with opposition to foreign forces intervening, this forms a 'trinity strategic framework,' employing both hard and soft tactics, threats and inducements.
Secondly, there is 'semantic warfare.' Lo Wen-chia pointed out that the definition of 'nation' as spoken by the Communist Party and by Taiwan is completely different. Taiwan's understanding of nation is at most cultural, but the CCP's 'Chinese nation' is equivalent to the People's Republic of China, and equivalent to the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party. By using the same terms but redefining their political connotations, the CCP re-binds previously separable identities of culture, nation, state, regime, and political system.
Lo Wen-chia believes that this CCP identity structure is 'you think it's à la carte, but it's actually a set menu,' tightly bundling identity recognition, cultural recognition, national recognition, state recognition, regime recognition, and political system recognition.
He then indicated that the third is 'narrative warfare,' which is an 'easy-to-enter, hard-to-exit, gradual entrapment strategy.' The CCP uses familiar, less sensitive, and easily accepted terms, gives them completely different definitions, and then constructs a tightly woven framework with laws and policies, turning it into a net or a jar; once inside, one can never escape.
Lo Wen-chia finally emphasized that in the past, China's main appeal was 'One Country, Two Systems,' later succeeded by '1992 Consensus, One China with respective interpretations.' However, Taiwanese people still didn't buy it. Now, the CCP has incorporated all past tactics—anti-Taiwan independence, one country two systems, 1992 Consensus, integrated demonstration zones—into a grand package, and additionally re-translated and rewritten the definitions of terms related to nation, culture, and history. 'Whether this grand package has a market depends on the wisdom of the Taiwanese people,' he concluded. (Editor: Lu Chia-jung / Chen Kai-yu) 1150511
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Lo Wen-chia published a lengthy comment on Facebook titled 'You think it's à la carte, but it's actually a set menu—Viewing the CCP's Identity Engineering on Taiwan from Xi Jinping's Meeting with Cheng Li-wen.'
In his article, he particularly emphasized that China's 'Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress' is slated to be implemented on July 1st. This is a legalized political and social engineering project carefully planned by the CCP over two years to consolidate border regions and stabilize its regime. It is not only used against Taiwan but also against ethnic minorities within and outside China, including Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Mongolians.
He noted that although the CCP passed the 'Anti-Secession Law' in 2005, providing a legal basis for military action against Taiwan, and has conducted continuous grey-zone military exercises and intimidation since 2022, public opinion within Taiwan and the international community's response, which supports Taiwan and opposes China, has grown stronger and shown no signs of diminishing.
He then stated, 'What can't be achieved by force, achieve by soft means; what can't be attacked externally, crumble from within.' This reflects the Communist Party's flexibility, and the 'Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress' is the culmination of this strategic and tactical guidance.
He said that after this law was passed in March and before its implementation in July, the new leadership of the Kuomintang serves as the best cooperative model.
Lo Wen-chia remarked that this law is worth Taiwan's attention, first for its 'legal warfare.' In the past, 'splitting the country is not allowed,' with military suppression if necessary, which was the 'Anti-Secession Law'; now, 'splitting the nation is not allowed,' with immediate criminal penalties, which is the 'Law on Promoting National Unity and Progress.' Coupled with opposition to foreign forces intervening, this forms a 'trinity strategic framework,' employing both hard and soft tactics, threats and inducements.
Secondly, there is 'semantic warfare.' Lo Wen-chia pointed out that the definition of 'nation' as spoken by the Communist Party and by Taiwan is completely different. Taiwan's understanding of nation is at most cultural, but the CCP's 'Chinese nation' is equivalent to the People's Republic of China, and equivalent to the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party. By using the same terms but redefining their political connotations, the CCP re-binds previously separable identities of culture, nation, state, regime, and political system.
Lo Wen-chia believes that this CCP identity structure is 'you think it's à la carte, but it's actually a set menu,' tightly bundling identity recognition, cultural recognition, national recognition, state recognition, regime recognition, and political system recognition.
He then indicated that the third is 'narrative warfare,' which is an 'easy-to-enter, hard-to-exit, gradual entrapment strategy.' The CCP uses familiar, less sensitive, and easily accepted terms, gives them completely different definitions, and then constructs a tightly woven framework with laws and policies, turning it into a net or a jar; once inside, one can never escape.
Lo Wen-chia finally emphasized that in the past, China's main appeal was 'One Country, Two Systems,' later succeeded by '1992 Consensus, One China with respective interpretations.' However, Taiwanese people still didn't buy it. Now, the CCP has incorporated all past tactics—anti-Taiwan independence, one country two systems, 1992 Consensus, integrated demonstration zones—into a grand package, and additionally re-translated and rewritten the definitions of terms related to nation, culture, and history. 'Whether this grand package has a market depends on the wisdom of the Taiwanese people,' he concluded. (Editor: Lu Chia-jung / Chen Kai-yu) 1150511
Choose to stand with the facts, every sponsorship from you is the power to protect press freedom.
Download the Central News Agency 'First-hand News' APP to stay updated with the latest news.
Reproduction, public broadcasting, public transmission, or use of the text, images, and videos on this website without authorization is prohibited.