NYT: Suspected Chinese Spy Offered $10,000 for Information to US Congressional Aide
According to The New York Times, a suspected Chinese spy offered $10,000 to a U.S. House China Committee aide in exchange for information. The aide reported the incident to the committee, which then recorded subsequent conversations and eventually involved the FBI, highlighting intensifying espionage activities between the U.S. and China.
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- 📰 Published: May 10, 2026 at 19:40
- 🔍 Collected: May 10, 2026 at 20:01 (21 min after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: May 10, 2026 at 22:05 (2h 4m after Collected)
Central News Agency
(Central News Agency, New York, 9th, compiled from foreign dispatches) The New York Times revealed that a man identifying himself as a business consultant contacted an aide to the U.S. House China Committee late last year, offering $10,000 (approximately NT$310,000) in exchange for information. The committee determined he was likely a Chinese spy, and the conversations were recorded.
The New York Times reported that U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to hold a summit in Beijing next week, focusing on trade agreements and a range of security issues, including Taiwan.
Meanwhile, as U.S.-China relations grow more tense, both countries have intensified their espionage activities against each other in recent months.
Last December, a man identifying himself as Chris Chen first contacted an aide to the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Chen's Gmail account name showed Kris Chen, but his email signature was Chris.
Chen claimed to be an employee of NimbusHub Strategic Consulting, a Hong Kong company, based in Singapore, with the title of business consultant. He sent an introductory email on December 17, filled with business jargon, describing it as an opportunity for "expert consultation and exchange of views."
Chen proposed that the aide could easily earn over $10,000 by agreeing to a phone call the following week to share details about the committee's work and U.S. foreign policy information concerning China.
Chen further mentioned that insights into U.S. trade or national security issues were particularly valuable, including plans after the Trump administration's military action in Venezuela in January this year.
However, the aide did not quietly accept, but instead reported the matter to his superiors on the committee. The committee quickly concluded that Chen's true identity might be a Chinese intelligence officer or contractor attempting to recruit new assets.
Nonetheless, the Republican staff of the committee agreed to continue contact with Chen, recording a series of phone calls to better understand Chen's strategy and interests.
After notifying his committee colleagues, the aide responded, expressing interest in expanding "consulting work beyond primary duties." From that point, Chen seemed to take the bait. In subsequent emails and phone calls, he expressed willingness to be flexible with work arrangements, while also clearly indicating eagerness to start payments.
For example, Chen said in a January phone call: "I can pay you $2,000, a $2,000 advance... as early as the next few days, just to make sure our operations get off to a smooth start."
Chen sometimes seemed particularly interested in understanding the views of U.S. authorities on public statements about China, such as China's commitment to purchase U.S. soybeans, or whether China would ease restrictions on rare earth minerals.
The congressional aide, before receiving payment, cut off contact with Chen at the end of February, citing an internal ethics decision. Chen expressed regret over the development, but a few days later emailed again, believing a solution could be found.
Chen stated: "If you are still interested in exploring the possibility of cooperation, I would be happy to introduce you to this alternative solution via a brief call. Please let me know if you are interested." The aide never responded.
After approximately two months of communication with Chen, the House China Committee referred the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The New York Times noted that Chen claimed to work for NimbusHub. The company's website stated it "provides clients with the tools and knowledge necessary to navigate an increasingly complex global environment," but the website contained Latin placeholder text, which is typically automatically filled into unfinished website sections.
Other clues also suggested NimbusHub might be a front for a Chinese intelligence agency. A report released by OpenAI in February on the malicious use of its artificial intelligence (AI) tools pointed out that some users had used ChatGPT to generate email drafts disguised as NimbusHub employees.
These emails were sent to U.S. government officials and business and financial policy analysts. The senders, like Chen, offered payment in exchange for information.
A few of these users, later banned by OpenAI, had instructed ChatGPT to flatter their targets, with prompts sent in simplified Chinese. OpenAI's report stated: "They requested email drafts to be concise, clear, professional, with subject lines creating a sense of urgency, and using subtle psychological cues."
NimbusHub did not respond to email requests for comment. New York Times reporters attempted to contact Chen via the Gmail address or mobile number he used to contact the congressional aide, but were unsuccessful.
On the 5th, New York Times reporters visited the address listed on NimbusHub's official website in Hong Kong's Tai Yau Building but did not find the company. NimbusHub was not listed on the office directory by the elevators, and two women at the lobby reception desk said they had never heard of NimbusHub.
Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, stated in a statement: "The so-called false claims of China engaging in espionage are completely baseless and lack factual evidence."
According to the New York Times, Chinese intelligence activities have targeted the House China Committee in the past. Last year, the committee revealed that someone had impersonated the committee's Republican chairman, John Moolenaar, sending emails to government agencies and other organizations in an attempt to obtain information that could lead to sanctions against Beijing. Cybersecurity investigators determined these emails were linked to a hacking group associated with China's Ministry of State Security.
Moolenaar stated in a statement: "The Chinese government actively targets Congress and congressional staff as part of its broader influence and intelligence gathering efforts, often using seemingly innocuous inquiries to obtain sensitive information."
Many lawmakers and their aides are young and relatively poorly paid in Washington.
Dakota Cary, an expert who studies Chinese espionage, said, "The Needle.
(Central News Agency, New York, 9th, compiled from foreign dispatches) The New York Times revealed that a man identifying himself as a business consultant contacted an aide to the U.S. House China Committee late last year, offering $10,000 (approximately NT$310,000) in exchange for information. The committee determined he was likely a Chinese spy, and the conversations were recorded.
The New York Times reported that U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to hold a summit in Beijing next week, focusing on trade agreements and a range of security issues, including Taiwan.
Meanwhile, as U.S.-China relations grow more tense, both countries have intensified their espionage activities against each other in recent months.
Last December, a man identifying himself as Chris Chen first contacted an aide to the U.S. House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Chen's Gmail account name showed Kris Chen, but his email signature was Chris.
Chen claimed to be an employee of NimbusHub Strategic Consulting, a Hong Kong company, based in Singapore, with the title of business consultant. He sent an introductory email on December 17, filled with business jargon, describing it as an opportunity for "expert consultation and exchange of views."
Chen proposed that the aide could easily earn over $10,000 by agreeing to a phone call the following week to share details about the committee's work and U.S. foreign policy information concerning China.
Chen further mentioned that insights into U.S. trade or national security issues were particularly valuable, including plans after the Trump administration's military action in Venezuela in January this year.
However, the aide did not quietly accept, but instead reported the matter to his superiors on the committee. The committee quickly concluded that Chen's true identity might be a Chinese intelligence officer or contractor attempting to recruit new assets.
Nonetheless, the Republican staff of the committee agreed to continue contact with Chen, recording a series of phone calls to better understand Chen's strategy and interests.
After notifying his committee colleagues, the aide responded, expressing interest in expanding "consulting work beyond primary duties." From that point, Chen seemed to take the bait. In subsequent emails and phone calls, he expressed willingness to be flexible with work arrangements, while also clearly indicating eagerness to start payments.
For example, Chen said in a January phone call: "I can pay you $2,000, a $2,000 advance... as early as the next few days, just to make sure our operations get off to a smooth start."
Chen sometimes seemed particularly interested in understanding the views of U.S. authorities on public statements about China, such as China's commitment to purchase U.S. soybeans, or whether China would ease restrictions on rare earth minerals.
The congressional aide, before receiving payment, cut off contact with Chen at the end of February, citing an internal ethics decision. Chen expressed regret over the development, but a few days later emailed again, believing a solution could be found.
Chen stated: "If you are still interested in exploring the possibility of cooperation, I would be happy to introduce you to this alternative solution via a brief call. Please let me know if you are interested." The aide never responded.
After approximately two months of communication with Chen, the House China Committee referred the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The New York Times noted that Chen claimed to work for NimbusHub. The company's website stated it "provides clients with the tools and knowledge necessary to navigate an increasingly complex global environment," but the website contained Latin placeholder text, which is typically automatically filled into unfinished website sections.
Other clues also suggested NimbusHub might be a front for a Chinese intelligence agency. A report released by OpenAI in February on the malicious use of its artificial intelligence (AI) tools pointed out that some users had used ChatGPT to generate email drafts disguised as NimbusHub employees.
These emails were sent to U.S. government officials and business and financial policy analysts. The senders, like Chen, offered payment in exchange for information.
A few of these users, later banned by OpenAI, had instructed ChatGPT to flatter their targets, with prompts sent in simplified Chinese. OpenAI's report stated: "They requested email drafts to be concise, clear, professional, with subject lines creating a sense of urgency, and using subtle psychological cues."
NimbusHub did not respond to email requests for comment. New York Times reporters attempted to contact Chen via the Gmail address or mobile number he used to contact the congressional aide, but were unsuccessful.
On the 5th, New York Times reporters visited the address listed on NimbusHub's official website in Hong Kong's Tai Yau Building but did not find the company. NimbusHub was not listed on the office directory by the elevators, and two women at the lobby reception desk said they had never heard of NimbusHub.
Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, stated in a statement: "The so-called false claims of China engaging in espionage are completely baseless and lack factual evidence."
According to the New York Times, Chinese intelligence activities have targeted the House China Committee in the past. Last year, the committee revealed that someone had impersonated the committee's Republican chairman, John Moolenaar, sending emails to government agencies and other organizations in an attempt to obtain information that could lead to sanctions against Beijing. Cybersecurity investigators determined these emails were linked to a hacking group associated with China's Ministry of State Security.
Moolenaar stated in a statement: "The Chinese government actively targets Congress and congressional staff as part of its broader influence and intelligence gathering efforts, often using seemingly innocuous inquiries to obtain sensitive information."
Many lawmakers and their aides are young and relatively poorly paid in Washington.
Dakota Cary, an expert who studies Chinese espionage, said, "The Needle.