To Counter China's Grey-Zone Normalization, Australian Expert Calls for International Support for Taiwan's Coast Guard
An Australian expert warns that China's "grey-zone fleet" is undermining the maritime control of Taiwan and other South China Sea nations, urging international support for Taiwan's Coast Guard to prevent the normalization of China's activities, which seek to increase pressure on Taiwan while avoiding outright conflict.
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- 📰 Published: May 8, 2026 at 20:11
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(CNA Reporter Chiu De-zhen Sydney 8th) Nathan Attrill, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), told CNA that China's "grey-zone fleet" is dedicated to eroding the maritime control of Taiwan and neighboring South China Sea countries. He called for regional partner countries to support Taiwan's Coast Guard to jointly prevent the normalization of China's "grey-zone" actions.
ASPI today published an article titled "China’s grey-zone fleet is eroding Taiwan’s control at sea," authored by Nathan Attrill, former senior analyst at the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of New Zealand and current senior analyst for ASPI's Cyber and Technology Security Program.
The article states that regarding the waters around Taiwan, China is building a network of civilian and militia vessels, a "grey-zone fleet," to harass, intimidate, and test Taiwan while avoiding reaching the "threshold of armed conflict" under international norms.
The article points out that China's "grey-zone fleet" consists of China Coast Guard vessels, maritime militia fishing boats, sand dredgers, logistics ships, and commercial vessels operated by unknown entities. These serve the Chinese government, which can deny any affiliation.
The article further notes that Beijing is effectively turning the waters around Taiwan into a testing ground to assess Taiwan's coastal defense, law enforcement, and crisis escalation management capabilities.
The article warns that the activities of China's "grey-zone fleet" are not only preparations for an attack on Taiwan but are increasingly focused on blockade, quarantine, and intense subversion. The aim is to normalize China's activities around Taiwan, weaken Taiwan's response capabilities, and gradually erode Taiwan's control over its near-shore waters without triggering conventional military conflict.
Attrill, in an email response to CNA's questions, stated that the strategic goal of China's "grey-zone fleet" is not only against Taiwan. The same logic also appears in the South China Sea, where China aims to gradually normalize its activities and challenge other countries' control in the region, weakening their response capabilities.
Attrill explained that under the cover of the "grey-zone fleet," China has flexible space for political propaganda. Any countermeasure against China would appear to be an unnecessary escalation; in other words, if a country reacts strongly, Beijing could use this as an excuse to portray that country as overreacting to so-called "civilian" activities.
Regarding subversive activities, he pointed out that infrastructure such as undersea internet cables, ports, and shipping networks in Taiwan, Australia, and even the Pacific region are vulnerable to disruption by China's "grey-zone fleet," while the Chinese government can remain disengaged. He said: "Such incidents can be disguised as accidents, general commercial activities, or actions without clear state involvement."
Attrill mentioned that while Australia is committed to preventing disruptive actions by China's "grey-zone fleet," there are many difficulties involved. He explained that the key lies in whether authorities can detect suspicious activities early, accurately attribute responsibility, and respond quickly and effectively.
He said: "This requires stronger maritime domain awareness, that is, a clearer real-time understanding of maritime dynamics, as well as closer monitoring of suspicious vessel behavior, and better protection and monitoring of undersea cables." Additionally, he believes Australia also needs to improve repair speeds and strengthen penalties for these disruptive actions.
Attrill conceded that the biggest challenge in dealing with China's "grey-zone fleet" is not its subversive means but its "ambiguity"—being neither civilian nor military—making it difficult to prove its true intentions, thus making it harder for governments to decide on appropriate countermeasures.
Attrill emphasized that facing China's actions, Indo-Pacific partner countries need to find ways to support Taiwan's Coast Guard. He said: "China is attempting to erode Taiwan's control at sea without first using warships. Taiwan's Coast Guard is best suited to respond to this pressure while avoiding immediate escalation to military confrontation."
He explained that freedom of navigation is not maintained solely by navies but requires coast guards to maintain maritime activity transparency and daily law enforcement; countries should support Taiwan's Coast Guard to prevent China from normalizing its grey-zone actions. (Editor: Tang Sheng-yang) 1150508
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ASPI today published an article titled "China’s grey-zone fleet is eroding Taiwan’s control at sea," authored by Nathan Attrill, former senior analyst at the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of New Zealand and current senior analyst for ASPI's Cyber and Technology Security Program.
The article states that regarding the waters around Taiwan, China is building a network of civilian and militia vessels, a "grey-zone fleet," to harass, intimidate, and test Taiwan while avoiding reaching the "threshold of armed conflict" under international norms.
The article points out that China's "grey-zone fleet" consists of China Coast Guard vessels, maritime militia fishing boats, sand dredgers, logistics ships, and commercial vessels operated by unknown entities. These serve the Chinese government, which can deny any affiliation.
The article further notes that Beijing is effectively turning the waters around Taiwan into a testing ground to assess Taiwan's coastal defense, law enforcement, and crisis escalation management capabilities.
The article warns that the activities of China's "grey-zone fleet" are not only preparations for an attack on Taiwan but are increasingly focused on blockade, quarantine, and intense subversion. The aim is to normalize China's activities around Taiwan, weaken Taiwan's response capabilities, and gradually erode Taiwan's control over its near-shore waters without triggering conventional military conflict.
Attrill, in an email response to CNA's questions, stated that the strategic goal of China's "grey-zone fleet" is not only against Taiwan. The same logic also appears in the South China Sea, where China aims to gradually normalize its activities and challenge other countries' control in the region, weakening their response capabilities.
Attrill explained that under the cover of the "grey-zone fleet," China has flexible space for political propaganda. Any countermeasure against China would appear to be an unnecessary escalation; in other words, if a country reacts strongly, Beijing could use this as an excuse to portray that country as overreacting to so-called "civilian" activities.
Regarding subversive activities, he pointed out that infrastructure such as undersea internet cables, ports, and shipping networks in Taiwan, Australia, and even the Pacific region are vulnerable to disruption by China's "grey-zone fleet," while the Chinese government can remain disengaged. He said: "Such incidents can be disguised as accidents, general commercial activities, or actions without clear state involvement."
Attrill mentioned that while Australia is committed to preventing disruptive actions by China's "grey-zone fleet," there are many difficulties involved. He explained that the key lies in whether authorities can detect suspicious activities early, accurately attribute responsibility, and respond quickly and effectively.
He said: "This requires stronger maritime domain awareness, that is, a clearer real-time understanding of maritime dynamics, as well as closer monitoring of suspicious vessel behavior, and better protection and monitoring of undersea cables." Additionally, he believes Australia also needs to improve repair speeds and strengthen penalties for these disruptive actions.
Attrill conceded that the biggest challenge in dealing with China's "grey-zone fleet" is not its subversive means but its "ambiguity"—being neither civilian nor military—making it difficult to prove its true intentions, thus making it harder for governments to decide on appropriate countermeasures.
Attrill emphasized that facing China's actions, Indo-Pacific partner countries need to find ways to support Taiwan's Coast Guard. He said: "China is attempting to erode Taiwan's control at sea without first using warships. Taiwan's Coast Guard is best suited to respond to this pressure while avoiding immediate escalation to military confrontation."
He explained that freedom of navigation is not maintained solely by navies but requires coast guards to maintain maritime activity transparency and daily law enforcement; countries should support Taiwan's Coast Guard to prevent China from normalizing its grey-zone actions. (Editor: Tang Sheng-yang) 1150508
Choose to stand with the facts, every sponsorship you provide is a force for protecting journalistic freedom.
Download CNA "First-hand News" APP to stay updated with the latest news.
The text, images, and videos on this website may not be reproduced, publicly broadcast, or publicly transmitted and used without authorization.