Scholar Warns: Gaode Map Can Become Strategic Asset, Not Merely Personal Data Issue
Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research scholar Yang Chang-jung warns that China's Gaode Map app's traffic data collection can evolve into a strategic information asset due to Chinese laws mandating cooperation with national intelligence. Taiwan should view data as a national security issue, not just a personal data problem.
📋 Article Processing Timeline
- 📰 Published: May 5, 2026 at 14:15
- 🔍 Collected: May 5, 2026 at 14:32 (16 min after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: May 5, 2026 at 14:37 (5 min after Collected)
Central News
(Central News Agency reporter Wu Shu-wei, Taipei, May 5th) China's Gaode Map App faces information security concerns. Yang Chang-jung, a scholar at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, points out that long-term accumulation of traffic information can be transformed into strategic information assets. Chinese law stipulates that all organizations and citizens have an obligation to cooperate with national intelligence work. Taiwan should regard data as a national security issue, rather than merely a personal data problem.
Gaode Map App's Street View presents 3D rendering, even showing traffic light countdowns in some areas of Taiwan. The Ministry of Digital Affairs previously stated that, according to the Cybersecurity Management Act, Gaode Map is a product that endangers national information and communication security, and government agencies are prohibited from using it. A cybersecurity assessment will also be conducted.
Yang Chang-jung, an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research's Division of Defense Strategy and Resources, published an analysis titled "Legal and National Security Risks of Gaode Map Data Collection" on the Institute's official website.
Yang Chang-jung pointed out that modern navigation software is no longer merely a route guidance tool but a comprehensive intelligence gathering platform. The types of data collected include GPS coordinates, continuous movement trajectories, and patterns of停留 (stay/stop). Even without direct connection to official data, traffic signals, infrastructure operation modes, and group activity patterns can be inferred through data analysis and transformed into intelligence by existing methods.
Yang Chang-jung cited an example where a French naval officer, by recording his jogging route via the Strava application, inadvertently exposed the location of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, proving that such data can reveal the locations of sensitive facilities. Anonymization has limited effectiveness because only a few spatio-temporal points are needed to identify most individuals.
Yang Chang-jung analyzed that current discussions mostly use "Chinese capital background" as the criterion for risk judgment, which is legally insufficient. The focus should return to jurisdiction, meaning whether the service is subject to the national security and intelligence legal system of a specific country. China's "Cybersecurity Law" and "National Intelligence Law" form a clear institutional arrangement.
Yang Chang-jung pointed out that China's "National Intelligence Law" stipulates that all organizations and citizens have an obligation to support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence work. This regulation has both personal and territorial effects, covering enterprises established in China, services operating within China, and even organizations and personnel with substantial connections. Therefore, some platforms that appear to have no Chinese capital or have complex structures may still fall within the high-risk range, and judging solely by equity structure may lead to misjudgment.
Regarding the transformation of data nature, Yang Chang-jung stated that civilian data is no longer merely a commercial asset but may have national asset attributes. When the law allows the state to directly access enterprise data and lacks supervision, the boundary between civilian data and national intelligence is compressed. This also explains why seemingly harmless functions like traffic information, after long-term accumulation, can be transformed into strategic information assets.
Yang Chang-jung mentioned that once Taiwanese data crosses borders, it will face issues such as inability to effectively supervise its use, difficulty in obtaining information through judicial means, and inability to request deletion or restriction of reuse, forming a one-way data flow. The issues revealed by Gaode Map are not merely problems with a single application, but structural risks arising from cross-border data under different legal systems. Taiwan should treat data as a national security issue, not just a personal data problem, otherwise, it will be difficult to effectively respond to long-term challenges. (Editor: Wan Shu-chang) 1150505
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(Central News Agency reporter Wu Shu-wei, Taipei, May 5th) China's Gaode Map App faces information security concerns. Yang Chang-jung, a scholar at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, points out that long-term accumulation of traffic information can be transformed into strategic information assets. Chinese law stipulates that all organizations and citizens have an obligation to cooperate with national intelligence work. Taiwan should regard data as a national security issue, rather than merely a personal data problem.
Gaode Map App's Street View presents 3D rendering, even showing traffic light countdowns in some areas of Taiwan. The Ministry of Digital Affairs previously stated that, according to the Cybersecurity Management Act, Gaode Map is a product that endangers national information and communication security, and government agencies are prohibited from using it. A cybersecurity assessment will also be conducted.
Yang Chang-jung, an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research's Division of Defense Strategy and Resources, published an analysis titled "Legal and National Security Risks of Gaode Map Data Collection" on the Institute's official website.
Yang Chang-jung pointed out that modern navigation software is no longer merely a route guidance tool but a comprehensive intelligence gathering platform. The types of data collected include GPS coordinates, continuous movement trajectories, and patterns of停留 (stay/stop). Even without direct connection to official data, traffic signals, infrastructure operation modes, and group activity patterns can be inferred through data analysis and transformed into intelligence by existing methods.
Yang Chang-jung cited an example where a French naval officer, by recording his jogging route via the Strava application, inadvertently exposed the location of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, proving that such data can reveal the locations of sensitive facilities. Anonymization has limited effectiveness because only a few spatio-temporal points are needed to identify most individuals.
Yang Chang-jung analyzed that current discussions mostly use "Chinese capital background" as the criterion for risk judgment, which is legally insufficient. The focus should return to jurisdiction, meaning whether the service is subject to the national security and intelligence legal system of a specific country. China's "Cybersecurity Law" and "National Intelligence Law" form a clear institutional arrangement.
Yang Chang-jung pointed out that China's "National Intelligence Law" stipulates that all organizations and citizens have an obligation to support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence work. This regulation has both personal and territorial effects, covering enterprises established in China, services operating within China, and even organizations and personnel with substantial connections. Therefore, some platforms that appear to have no Chinese capital or have complex structures may still fall within the high-risk range, and judging solely by equity structure may lead to misjudgment.
Regarding the transformation of data nature, Yang Chang-jung stated that civilian data is no longer merely a commercial asset but may have national asset attributes. When the law allows the state to directly access enterprise data and lacks supervision, the boundary between civilian data and national intelligence is compressed. This also explains why seemingly harmless functions like traffic information, after long-term accumulation, can be transformed into strategic information assets.
Yang Chang-jung mentioned that once Taiwanese data crosses borders, it will face issues such as inability to effectively supervise its use, difficulty in obtaining information through judicial means, and inability to request deletion or restriction of reuse, forming a one-way data flow. The issues revealed by Gaode Map are not merely problems with a single application, but structural risks arising from cross-border data under different legal systems. Taiwan should treat data as a national security issue, not just a personal data problem, otherwise, it will be difficult to effectively respond to long-term challenges. (Editor: Wan Shu-chang) 1150505
Choose to stand with facts. Your every sponsorship is a force to protect press freedom.
Download the Central News Agency's "First-hand News" APP to stay updated with the latest news.
Text, images, and videos on this website may not be reproduced, publicly broadcast, or publicly transmitted and used without authorization.