2026 Local Elections Approaching: Taiwan Security Association Reveals New Patterns of China's Election Interference
The Taiwan Security Association has released a report warning that China is employing new interference tactics, such as AI disinformation, legal loopholes, and grassroots infiltration, ahead of the 2026 local elections. Scholars are calling for increased public vigilance, strengthened defense mechanisms, and the implementation of a foreign influence disclosure system.
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- 📰 Published: May 2, 2026 at 21:04
- 🔍 Collected: May 2, 2026 at 21:31 (27 min after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: May 2, 2026 at 21:37 (5 min after Collected)
Central News Agency
(Central News Agency reporter Wen Kuei-hsiang, Taipei, 2nd) With the local elections scheduled for the end of the year, the Taiwan Security Association today released its "China Threat Report." Scholars stated that China is infiltrating Taiwan through means such as travel hospitality, AI disinformation, and legal loopholes, and that China's cognitive warfare has deeply penetrated local communities. They called on citizens to heighten their vigilance and strengthen defense mechanisms to protect their votes and Taiwan's democratic frontline.
The Taiwan Security Association today launched the first report in its "China Threat Report" series and co-hosted the inaugural "2026 China Threat Report: China's Election Interference Hidden Behind the Ballots" seminar with the Taiwan Independence Party at an afternoon event.
Lee Yi-tzu, an assistant researcher at the Taiwan Security Association, shared research findings, pointing out that Taiwan still has multiple gray areas in its laws and systems. These include the lack of effective regulation for China's long-term cultivation of "local collaborators," the fact that internal party elections are not governed by the Election and Recall Act, and that local ward chiefs only need to simply report their visits to China, without being subject to strict civil servant regulations.
She stated that China's election interference is not solely focused on supporting specific candidates but aims to gradually deepen its local influence through long-term cultivation of grassroots connections and local networks. She emphasized that the focus of local elections is not on breadth, but on observing the depth of China's infiltration and rooting in Taiwan's grassroots.
Lee Yi-tzu mentioned that during election periods, a large amount of artificial intelligence (AI) generated information often floods various online platforms. However, there is currently a lack of clear legal basis to require platforms to remove such content, leaving citizens to rely on their own cognitive abilities to discern true from false information. Additionally, national security cases commonly face enforcement technical difficulties such as "difficulty tracing financial flows and identifying aliases," which also affects investigation efficiency.
She advocated that Taiwan should refer to countries like the United States, Australia, and Singapore to establish a "foreign influence disclosure system," shifting the obligation of disclosure and clarification to individuals and organizations. This would require those with financial ties or interest chains with China to proactively disclose information to reduce the risk of infiltration.
Regarding short-term reforms, Lee Yi-tzu suggested that the government should actively integrate and publicize information related to China's threats. At the same time, candidate qualification reviews should be moved up to the time of establishing political donation accounts, rather than waiting until official registration for candidacy. She also called on the Mainland Affairs Council and the Control Yuan to establish clearer personnel control and reporting systems for ward chiefs and cross-strait exchanges.
Ho Cheng-hui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Taiwan Security Association, stated that China's infiltration of Taiwan is like an "iceberg." The local infiltration and systemic risks hidden beneath the surface of the iceberg are far more alarming than the military exercises seen by the outside world. "When you see the iceberg, it means the real threat is already close at hand."
Ho Cheng-hui pointed out that in recent years, China has shifted to an "on-site hospitality" infiltration model, contacting ward chiefs and local opinion leaders through low-cost exchange groups and grassroots visits. It uses small payments to circumvent the legal definition of "quid pro quo," making it harder to detect compared to direct financial provision.
He stated that China also establishes multiple layers of isolation and legal breakpoints through proxies in Taiwan and uses cryptocurrencies, underground banks, gold shops, and offshore financial flows in third countries for financial disguise. These methods increase the difficulty for prosecutors to investigate. Furthermore, while the conviction rate for general criminal cases is about 96%, the conviction rate for national security cases is less than 70%, indicating deficiencies in the current system.
Ho Cheng-hui called for increasing current legal penalties and punishment thresholds. The government should also more actively disclose information on China's infiltration to enhance public literacy and self-defense awareness. He emphasized, "Law is not the only line of defense." Facing China's complex infiltration and AI information warfare, the overall vigilance and resilience of society are equally important. (Editors: Lin Ke-lun, Yang Lan-hsuan) 1150502
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(Central News Agency reporter Wen Kuei-hsiang, Taipei, 2nd) With the local elections scheduled for the end of the year, the Taiwan Security Association today released its "China Threat Report." Scholars stated that China is infiltrating Taiwan through means such as travel hospitality, AI disinformation, and legal loopholes, and that China's cognitive warfare has deeply penetrated local communities. They called on citizens to heighten their vigilance and strengthen defense mechanisms to protect their votes and Taiwan's democratic frontline.
The Taiwan Security Association today launched the first report in its "China Threat Report" series and co-hosted the inaugural "2026 China Threat Report: China's Election Interference Hidden Behind the Ballots" seminar with the Taiwan Independence Party at an afternoon event.
Lee Yi-tzu, an assistant researcher at the Taiwan Security Association, shared research findings, pointing out that Taiwan still has multiple gray areas in its laws and systems. These include the lack of effective regulation for China's long-term cultivation of "local collaborators," the fact that internal party elections are not governed by the Election and Recall Act, and that local ward chiefs only need to simply report their visits to China, without being subject to strict civil servant regulations.
She stated that China's election interference is not solely focused on supporting specific candidates but aims to gradually deepen its local influence through long-term cultivation of grassroots connections and local networks. She emphasized that the focus of local elections is not on breadth, but on observing the depth of China's infiltration and rooting in Taiwan's grassroots.
Lee Yi-tzu mentioned that during election periods, a large amount of artificial intelligence (AI) generated information often floods various online platforms. However, there is currently a lack of clear legal basis to require platforms to remove such content, leaving citizens to rely on their own cognitive abilities to discern true from false information. Additionally, national security cases commonly face enforcement technical difficulties such as "difficulty tracing financial flows and identifying aliases," which also affects investigation efficiency.
She advocated that Taiwan should refer to countries like the United States, Australia, and Singapore to establish a "foreign influence disclosure system," shifting the obligation of disclosure and clarification to individuals and organizations. This would require those with financial ties or interest chains with China to proactively disclose information to reduce the risk of infiltration.
Regarding short-term reforms, Lee Yi-tzu suggested that the government should actively integrate and publicize information related to China's threats. At the same time, candidate qualification reviews should be moved up to the time of establishing political donation accounts, rather than waiting until official registration for candidacy. She also called on the Mainland Affairs Council and the Control Yuan to establish clearer personnel control and reporting systems for ward chiefs and cross-strait exchanges.
Ho Cheng-hui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Taiwan Security Association, stated that China's infiltration of Taiwan is like an "iceberg." The local infiltration and systemic risks hidden beneath the surface of the iceberg are far more alarming than the military exercises seen by the outside world. "When you see the iceberg, it means the real threat is already close at hand."
Ho Cheng-hui pointed out that in recent years, China has shifted to an "on-site hospitality" infiltration model, contacting ward chiefs and local opinion leaders through low-cost exchange groups and grassroots visits. It uses small payments to circumvent the legal definition of "quid pro quo," making it harder to detect compared to direct financial provision.
He stated that China also establishes multiple layers of isolation and legal breakpoints through proxies in Taiwan and uses cryptocurrencies, underground banks, gold shops, and offshore financial flows in third countries for financial disguise. These methods increase the difficulty for prosecutors to investigate. Furthermore, while the conviction rate for general criminal cases is about 96%, the conviction rate for national security cases is less than 70%, indicating deficiencies in the current system.
Ho Cheng-hui called for increasing current legal penalties and punishment thresholds. The government should also more actively disclose information on China's infiltration to enhance public literacy and self-defense awareness. He emphasized, "Law is not the only line of defense." Facing China's complex infiltration and AI information warfare, the overall vigilance and resilience of society are equally important. (Editors: Lin Ke-lun, Yang Lan-hsuan) 1150502
Choose to stand with facts; every sponsorship you provide is a force to protect press freedom.
Download the Central News Agency's "First-hand News" APP to stay updated with the latest news.
The text, images, and audio/video on this website may not be reproduced, publicly broadcast, publicly transmitted, or utilized without authorization.