Iran's Revolutionary Guard Wields Real Power in Wartime, Supreme Leader's Role Diminished
With the war between Iran, the US, and Israel lasting over two months, Tehran's power apex is no longer a singular religious authority. Though Supreme Leader Khamenei's injured son, Mojtaba, succeeded him, power has shifted to the generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Wartime pressures have concentrated decision-making in a hardline core led by the IRGC, indicating a more aggressive stance in future negotiations.
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- 📰 Published: April 30, 2026 at 17:43
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DUBAI (CNA) -- As the war between Iran and the United States and Israel continues for over two months, the pinnacle of power in Tehran is no longer a singular and absolute religious authority. This stark departure from the past could lead Iran to take an even harder stance when considering resuming negotiations with Washington.
Reuters reported that since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always revolved around a 'Supreme Leader' who held final authority over critical state affairs.
However, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's death on the first day of the war, and his injured son Mojtaba Khamenei's succession, ushered in a new order dominated by generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and lacking a decisive arbiter.
According to three sources familiar with internal discussions, although Mojtaba remains at the top of the system, his role is primarily to legitimize the generals' decisions rather than to issue commands himself.
Iranian officials and analysts point out that wartime pressures have concentrated power within a smaller, more hardline core. This core is centered around the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Supreme Leader's Office, and the Revolutionary Guard, with the latter now dominating military strategy and key political decisions.
A Pakistani senior official briefed on US-Iran peace talks noted, 'The Iranians' response is painfully slow. There is clearly a lack of a unified decision-making command structure internally; sometimes it takes two to three days to respond.'
Analysts indicate that the obstacle to US-Iran peace talks is not Tehran's internal strife, but the huge gap between the conditions Washington is willing to offer and the bottom line acceptable to Iran's hardline Revolutionary Guard.
In negotiations with the US, Iran's diplomatic window is Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, but the recently added parliamentary speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf plays an even more crucial role.
Qalibaf, a former IRGC commander and Tehran mayor, has become a key conduit connecting Iran's political, security, and religious elites during the Middle East war.
However, according to Pakistani and two Iranian sources, the true core interlocutor on the front line is IRGC Commander-in-Chief Ahmad Vahidi. He was identified as a key Iranian figure on the very night the ceasefire agreement was announced.
Sources revealed that Mojtaba was severely injured in the first round of Israeli-US airstrikes, suffering facial disfigurement and severe leg injuries. For security reasons, he has not appeared in public, communicating only through IRGC staff or limited audio links.
Tehran submitted a new proposal to Washington on April 27. According to senior sources, the new proposal suggests phased negotiations, temporarily setting aside the nuclear issue until after the war ends and Persian Gulf shipping disputes are resolved; but Washington insists on addressing the nuclear issue from the outset.
Former US diplomat and Iran expert Alan Eyre stated, 'Neither side actually has the will to negotiate.' He believes both sides think time will weaken the opponent, with Iran using the Strait of Hormuz as leverage and Washington aiming to weaken through economic pressure and blockade.
Insiders suggest that although Mojtaba is formally the supreme authority, he is more of a 'signer' than a 'commander,' merely endorsing the outcomes after institutional consensus. They point out that real power has shifted to a unified wartime leadership centered around the Supreme National Security Council.
Iranian analyst Arash Azizi remarked, 'Important agreements might pass through him, but I cannot imagine him vetoing the National Security Council. How could he oppose those who are actually running the war?'
Sources told Reuters that Mojtaba's ascent depended on the support of the Revolutionary Guard, which sidelined pragmatists and backed him as the guardian of the hardline approach. The Revolutionary Guard has grown stronger amidst the war, suggesting that future Iran will adopt a more aggressive foreign policy and harsher domestic repression.
This change marks a shift in the power structure from 'religious priority' to 'security dominance.' Former US negotiator Aaron David Miller noted, 'From theocracy to hard power, from clerical influence to the Revolutionary Guard. This is how Iran is governed now.' (Compiled by Liu Shuqin) 1150430
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Reuters reported that since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always revolved around a 'Supreme Leader' who held final authority over critical state affairs.
However, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's death on the first day of the war, and his injured son Mojtaba Khamenei's succession, ushered in a new order dominated by generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and lacking a decisive arbiter.
According to three sources familiar with internal discussions, although Mojtaba remains at the top of the system, his role is primarily to legitimize the generals' decisions rather than to issue commands himself.
Iranian officials and analysts point out that wartime pressures have concentrated power within a smaller, more hardline core. This core is centered around the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Supreme Leader's Office, and the Revolutionary Guard, with the latter now dominating military strategy and key political decisions.
A Pakistani senior official briefed on US-Iran peace talks noted, 'The Iranians' response is painfully slow. There is clearly a lack of a unified decision-making command structure internally; sometimes it takes two to three days to respond.'
Analysts indicate that the obstacle to US-Iran peace talks is not Tehran's internal strife, but the huge gap between the conditions Washington is willing to offer and the bottom line acceptable to Iran's hardline Revolutionary Guard.
In negotiations with the US, Iran's diplomatic window is Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, but the recently added parliamentary speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf plays an even more crucial role.
Qalibaf, a former IRGC commander and Tehran mayor, has become a key conduit connecting Iran's political, security, and religious elites during the Middle East war.
However, according to Pakistani and two Iranian sources, the true core interlocutor on the front line is IRGC Commander-in-Chief Ahmad Vahidi. He was identified as a key Iranian figure on the very night the ceasefire agreement was announced.
Sources revealed that Mojtaba was severely injured in the first round of Israeli-US airstrikes, suffering facial disfigurement and severe leg injuries. For security reasons, he has not appeared in public, communicating only through IRGC staff or limited audio links.
Tehran submitted a new proposal to Washington on April 27. According to senior sources, the new proposal suggests phased negotiations, temporarily setting aside the nuclear issue until after the war ends and Persian Gulf shipping disputes are resolved; but Washington insists on addressing the nuclear issue from the outset.
Former US diplomat and Iran expert Alan Eyre stated, 'Neither side actually has the will to negotiate.' He believes both sides think time will weaken the opponent, with Iran using the Strait of Hormuz as leverage and Washington aiming to weaken through economic pressure and blockade.
Insiders suggest that although Mojtaba is formally the supreme authority, he is more of a 'signer' than a 'commander,' merely endorsing the outcomes after institutional consensus. They point out that real power has shifted to a unified wartime leadership centered around the Supreme National Security Council.
Iranian analyst Arash Azizi remarked, 'Important agreements might pass through him, but I cannot imagine him vetoing the National Security Council. How could he oppose those who are actually running the war?'
Sources told Reuters that Mojtaba's ascent depended on the support of the Revolutionary Guard, which sidelined pragmatists and backed him as the guardian of the hardline approach. The Revolutionary Guard has grown stronger amidst the war, suggesting that future Iran will adopt a more aggressive foreign policy and harsher domestic repression.
This change marks a shift in the power structure from 'religious priority' to 'security dominance.' Former US negotiator Aaron David Miller noted, 'From theocracy to hard power, from clerical influence to the Revolutionary Guard. This is how Iran is governed now.' (Compiled by Liu Shuqin) 1150430
Choose to stand with facts; your every sponsorship is the power to protect press freedom.
Download CNA's 'Firsthand News' APP to get the latest news in real time.
Text, images, and videos on this website may not be reproduced, broadcast, transmitted, or used without authorization.