Estonian Security Report: China Increases Influence, Manipulates Cultural Exchanges
The Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS) 2025 annual report warns that China is escalating its influence operations in Estonia under the guise of cultural exchanges and is increasingly targeting tech and security professionals for recruitment via platforms like LinkedIn.
📋 Article Processing Timeline
- 📰 Published: April 14, 2026 at 15:51
- 🔍 Collected: April 14, 2026 at 16:01 (10 min after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: April 19, 2026 at 15:44 (119h 43m after Collected)
Central News Agency
(Central News Agency reporter You Yaoru, Vilnius, 14th) The Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS) released its 2025 annual report yesterday, pointing out that China has continued to expand its influence in Estonia in recent years. Through various activities such as cultural exchanges and invitations, China provides local residents with carefully designed experiences to shape a positive perception of China.
According to the Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), the report released on the 13th by the Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS) noted that, under the guise of cultural cooperation, China dispatches propagandists to Europe to promote the "China story" with specific narratives. This is done to downplay external attention to issues such as China's human rights problems, unfair economic practices, and its stance supporting Russia's war against Ukraine.
The ISS stated that the Chinese Embassy in Estonia has stepped up cultural activities in recent years, cooperating with local governments to hold various exchanges. They also arrange meetings with politicians and business figures to build networks and influence their views on China. At the same time, China is actively targeting younger demographics, including arranging for the Chinese ambassador to frequently visit schools and universities.
According to the report, the ISS pointed out that Chinese authorities believe sharing personal experiences of visiting China by foreigners is more persuasive. Therefore, the embassy invites Estonian politicians, scholars, and media professionals to visit China. During 2025, multiple Estonian politicians, cultural workers, experts, and media personnel visited China.
The report gave an example: in October 2025, a media delegation traveled to Nanjing and Suzhou under arrangements by the Jiangsu Provincial Government to learn about China's history and technological development. In the same month, young Estonian experts traveled to Hangzhou to participate in the "Europe-China Youth Dialogue" hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The ISS noted that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has close ties with Chinese intelligence agencies.
According to reports, the Chinese Embassy also placed multiple advertorials in media outlets in Estonia and the Baltic region last year. The content involved narratives about "democracy," "fair trade," and even the claim that Taiwan "historically" belongs to China, despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has never actually ruled Taiwan.
China also assists in arranging contact with local journalists and finding media platforms willing to publish relevant content by paying public relations and media service fees.
In addition, the ISS analyzed that China's intelligence activities primarily target individuals in fields such as technology and security. They establish contact through professional platforms like LinkedIn and use invitations to visit China or neighboring countries as incentives to seek further engagement and recruitment opportunities.
The ISS report also mentioned that the "Estonia-China Chamber of Commerce," established in 2022, actively reaches out to local technology industries and startups, proposing attractive cooperation schemes. It mostly directly targets technical leads rather than corporate executives or general contact points.
The ISS also found that approaches made through workplace platforms have significantly increased in 2025. The recent trend is to first post job opportunities and then filter candidates to approach. Individuals with government backgrounds or those working in diplomacy and security policy fields are priority targets.
According to other reports, the British intelligence agency MI5 also warned Parliament and relevant personnel last November to be wary of recruitment activities conducted by China via the LinkedIn platform. As early as 2023, MI5 pointed out that nearly 20,000 Britons had been contacted by associated accounts. (Editor: Chen Huiping) 1150414
Choose to stand with the facts. Every one of your sponsorships is a force protecting press freedom.
Download the Central News Agency "First-hand News" APP to grasp the latest news instantly.
The text, images, and audio-visual materials on this website may not be reproduced, publicly broadcast, or publicly transmitted and utilized without authorization.
(Central News Agency reporter You Yaoru, Vilnius, 14th) The Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS) released its 2025 annual report yesterday, pointing out that China has continued to expand its influence in Estonia in recent years. Through various activities such as cultural exchanges and invitations, China provides local residents with carefully designed experiences to shape a positive perception of China.
According to the Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), the report released on the 13th by the Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS) noted that, under the guise of cultural cooperation, China dispatches propagandists to Europe to promote the "China story" with specific narratives. This is done to downplay external attention to issues such as China's human rights problems, unfair economic practices, and its stance supporting Russia's war against Ukraine.
The ISS stated that the Chinese Embassy in Estonia has stepped up cultural activities in recent years, cooperating with local governments to hold various exchanges. They also arrange meetings with politicians and business figures to build networks and influence their views on China. At the same time, China is actively targeting younger demographics, including arranging for the Chinese ambassador to frequently visit schools and universities.
According to the report, the ISS pointed out that Chinese authorities believe sharing personal experiences of visiting China by foreigners is more persuasive. Therefore, the embassy invites Estonian politicians, scholars, and media professionals to visit China. During 2025, multiple Estonian politicians, cultural workers, experts, and media personnel visited China.
The report gave an example: in October 2025, a media delegation traveled to Nanjing and Suzhou under arrangements by the Jiangsu Provincial Government to learn about China's history and technological development. In the same month, young Estonian experts traveled to Hangzhou to participate in the "Europe-China Youth Dialogue" hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The ISS noted that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has close ties with Chinese intelligence agencies.
According to reports, the Chinese Embassy also placed multiple advertorials in media outlets in Estonia and the Baltic region last year. The content involved narratives about "democracy," "fair trade," and even the claim that Taiwan "historically" belongs to China, despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has never actually ruled Taiwan.
China also assists in arranging contact with local journalists and finding media platforms willing to publish relevant content by paying public relations and media service fees.
In addition, the ISS analyzed that China's intelligence activities primarily target individuals in fields such as technology and security. They establish contact through professional platforms like LinkedIn and use invitations to visit China or neighboring countries as incentives to seek further engagement and recruitment opportunities.
The ISS report also mentioned that the "Estonia-China Chamber of Commerce," established in 2022, actively reaches out to local technology industries and startups, proposing attractive cooperation schemes. It mostly directly targets technical leads rather than corporate executives or general contact points.
The ISS also found that approaches made through workplace platforms have significantly increased in 2025. The recent trend is to first post job opportunities and then filter candidates to approach. Individuals with government backgrounds or those working in diplomacy and security policy fields are priority targets.
According to other reports, the British intelligence agency MI5 also warned Parliament and relevant personnel last November to be wary of recruitment activities conducted by China via the LinkedIn platform. As early as 2023, MI5 pointed out that nearly 20,000 Britons had been contacted by associated accounts. (Editor: Chen Huiping) 1150414
Choose to stand with the facts. Every one of your sponsorships is a force protecting press freedom.
Download the Central News Agency "First-hand News" APP to grasp the latest news instantly.
The text, images, and audio-visual materials on this website may not be reproduced, publicly broadcast, or publicly transmitted and utilized without authorization.