Xi's North Korea Visit Omits 'Denuclearization'; Analysts Say Recognition of Nuclear Status Impossible
Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded a state visit to North Korea, and the Chinese side's readout of the talks did not mention 'denuclearization.' Analysts believe China's current silence on denuclearization is a phased strategic choice, but it cannot recognize North Korea's nuclear status, as doing so would reshape the security landscape of East Asia.
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(Central News Agency, Taipei, June 10) Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded a state visit to North Korea, and the statement released by the Chinese side made no mention of North Korea's 'denuclearization.' A comprehensive analysis by BBC Chinese suggests that China's current emphasis on economic cooperation while avoiding the topic of denuclearization is merely a phased strategic choice; it is impossible for China to recognize North Korea as a nuclear state, as this would affect the entire security landscape of East Asia.
Xi Jinping paid a state visit to North Korea on the 8th and 9th, holding talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
According to a BBC Chinese report on the 9th, the word 'denuclearization' did not appear even once in the meeting summary released by Xinhua News Agency. This marks a significant shift from Xi's 2019 visit to North Korea, where he repeatedly mentioned the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialogue between North Korea and the United States.
In fact, since Kim Jong Un's visit to China last September, the term 'denuclearization' has disappeared from official Chinese statements.
Prior to Xi's visit to North Korea, Kim Jong Un's sister, Kim Yo Jong, who is a department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, issued a statement declaring that the 'status as a nuclear weapons state is an inviolable bottom line.' On the same day Xi arrived in Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un called for an 'exponential' expansion of the country's nuclear arsenal.
Lee Sang-sook, a Ph.D. at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, described the current situation as an 'acquiescence effect': by not mentioning denuclearization and emphasizing economic cooperation, it appears to the outside world as tacit acceptance of North Korea's nuclear reality.
The report states that there is a red line between 'acquiescence' and 'recognition' that China will not easily cross.
Lee Chang-hyung, an honorary research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, stated that it is impossible for China to recognize North Korea's nuclear status. For China, if North Korea's nuclear status were recognized, the rationale for preventing South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons would disappear. 'Ultimately, Taiwan would also be drawn into this, which is absolutely unacceptable for China.' In other words, the cost of recognizing North Korea's nuclear status is not just a change in the Korean Peninsula's landscape, but a complete rewrite of the East Asian security architecture.
Lee Chang-hyung also mentioned that he had discussed the issue of nuclear leakage with nuclear experts from the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences. The Chinese side judged that if a nuclear material leakage accident occurred in North Korea's Yongbyon or other areas, an area within a radius of approximately 400 kilometers would be contaminated, with indirect contamination reaching up to 1,000 kilometers. This means that China's northeastern region could face a direct threat of nuclear contamination.
Lee Chang-hyung said that China's active promotion of the Six-Party Talks in the past was based on the same logic. 'It was not to help South Korea, but to safeguard its own national security.'
The report suggests that China's current silence on 'denuclearization' is more of a phased strategic choice than a fundamental shift in position. Lee Sang-sook predicted that in the long run, China might still raise the denuclearization issue with North Korea again.
Lee Chang-hyung believes that compared to approving or recognizing North Korea's nuclear status, maintaining the status quo or merely staying with peaceful rhetoric is far more likely, because recognizing North Korea's nuclear status would change the security landscape and even the geopolitical features of East Asia, and China would not make such an extraordinary move.
Regarding the absence of 'denuclearization' in the talks between Xi and Kim, Hong Kong's Ming Pao Daily cited South Korean scholar Hong Min, who said that China has undergone a significant transformation. Previously a mediator in denuclearization talks between North Korea and the US, China now views North Korea as a powerful strategic partner to counter the United States. (Editor: Chen Kaiyu / Zhu Jianling) 1150610
Xi Jinping paid a state visit to North Korea on the 8th and 9th, holding talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
According to a BBC Chinese report on the 9th, the word 'denuclearization' did not appear even once in the meeting summary released by Xinhua News Agency. This marks a significant shift from Xi's 2019 visit to North Korea, where he repeatedly mentioned the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and dialogue between North Korea and the United States.
In fact, since Kim Jong Un's visit to China last September, the term 'denuclearization' has disappeared from official Chinese statements.
Prior to Xi's visit to North Korea, Kim Jong Un's sister, Kim Yo Jong, who is a department director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, issued a statement declaring that the 'status as a nuclear weapons state is an inviolable bottom line.' On the same day Xi arrived in Pyongyang, Kim Jong Un called for an 'exponential' expansion of the country's nuclear arsenal.
Lee Sang-sook, a Ph.D. at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, described the current situation as an 'acquiescence effect': by not mentioning denuclearization and emphasizing economic cooperation, it appears to the outside world as tacit acceptance of North Korea's nuclear reality.
The report states that there is a red line between 'acquiescence' and 'recognition' that China will not easily cross.
Lee Chang-hyung, an honorary research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, stated that it is impossible for China to recognize North Korea's nuclear status. For China, if North Korea's nuclear status were recognized, the rationale for preventing South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons would disappear. 'Ultimately, Taiwan would also be drawn into this, which is absolutely unacceptable for China.' In other words, the cost of recognizing North Korea's nuclear status is not just a change in the Korean Peninsula's landscape, but a complete rewrite of the East Asian security architecture.
Lee Chang-hyung also mentioned that he had discussed the issue of nuclear leakage with nuclear experts from the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences. The Chinese side judged that if a nuclear material leakage accident occurred in North Korea's Yongbyon or other areas, an area within a radius of approximately 400 kilometers would be contaminated, with indirect contamination reaching up to 1,000 kilometers. This means that China's northeastern region could face a direct threat of nuclear contamination.
Lee Chang-hyung said that China's active promotion of the Six-Party Talks in the past was based on the same logic. 'It was not to help South Korea, but to safeguard its own national security.'
The report suggests that China's current silence on 'denuclearization' is more of a phased strategic choice than a fundamental shift in position. Lee Sang-sook predicted that in the long run, China might still raise the denuclearization issue with North Korea again.
Lee Chang-hyung believes that compared to approving or recognizing North Korea's nuclear status, maintaining the status quo or merely staying with peaceful rhetoric is far more likely, because recognizing North Korea's nuclear status would change the security landscape and even the geopolitical features of East Asia, and China would not make such an extraordinary move.
Regarding the absence of 'denuclearization' in the talks between Xi and Kim, Hong Kong's Ming Pao Daily cited South Korean scholar Hong Min, who said that China has undergone a significant transformation. Previously a mediator in denuclearization talks between North Korea and the US, China now views North Korea as a powerful strategic partner to counter the United States. (Editor: Chen Kaiyu / Zhu Jianling) 1150610
FAQ
Why has China stopped mentioning North Korea's denuclearization?
Analysts see it as a phased strategic choice, positioning North Korea as a partner against the US amid US-China rivalry.
Why won't China recognize North Korea's nuclear status?
Recognition would trigger nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan, involve Taiwan, and fundamentally rewrite East Asia's security architecture.
What risk does a North Korean nuclear accident pose to China?
An accident at Yongbyon could directly contaminate a 400km radius and indirectly affect up to 1,000km, threatening Northeast China.