To Address the Seabed Battlefield, Taipei's Melbourne Office Chief Urges Australia to Learn from Taiwan's Experience
Lu Ming-ze, Director of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Melbourne, published an article via the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) urging Australia to leverage Taiwan's frontline experience in protecting submarine cables. Lu highlighted that since February 2023, Taiwan has accumulated practical experience in identifying suspicious vessels, monitoring tracking anomalies, and addressing the limitations of maritime law enforcement tools. He noted that Australia relies on just 15 submarine cables for 99% of its internet traffic, stressing the need for swift action. Lu also pointed out that the misinterpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 excludes Taiwan from international technical forums, hindering information sharing.
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- 📰 Published: June 4, 2026 at 12:14
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- 🤖 AI Analyzed: June 6, 2026 at 16:14 (51h 52m after Collected)
(Central News Agency, reporter Qiu Dezhen, Sydney, 4th) Lu Ming-ze, Director of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Melbourne, published an article through the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) urging Australia to draw on Taiwan's accumulated frontline experience as it works to strengthen the protection of critical seabed infrastructure.
ASPI published Lu's article titled "The seabed is becoming a battlefield. Taiwan has field notes" on the 4th. The article mentions that Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles warned at the 2026 Asia Defense Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, on May 30, stating that "the seabed will be a battlefield." Marles indicated that hostile nations, while attempting to damage critical seabed infrastructure of various countries, are also deliberately testing governments' response speeds, attribution thresholds for responsibility, and the political will to take countermeasures.
Lu stated that Taiwan has been continuously implementing related countermeasures since February 2023 and has accumulated rich practical experience. Taiwan has experience in identifying suspicious vessel behavior, monitoring vessels with tracking anomalies, and dealing with the limitations of existing maritime law enforcement tools.
Australia is currently working to enhance its ability to protect critical seabed infrastructure through the AUKUS trilateral security partnership. Lu urged Australia to recognize the value of learning from Taiwan's experience.
Lu emphasized that Australia needs to act quickly. Approximately 99% of Australia's internet traffic relies on just 15 submarine cables. These cables are the lifeline for Australia's financial services, healthcare systems, communication networks, and other economic sectors, yet they are difficult to protect and vulnerable to damage.
He stressed that Taiwan's experience is not theoretical. For example, on January 3, 2025, an international submarine cable in the waters north of Taiwan was cut, and Taiwanese authorities suspected a foreign-flagged cargo ship. The following month, a vessel flying the flag of Togo cut a cable connecting the main island of Taiwan and the Penghu archipelago. In June 2025, a Taiwanese court sentenced the Chinese captain of that vessel to three years in prison for intentionally damaging the submarine cable.
Lu pointed out that this verdict demonstrates Taiwan's accumulated investigative experience regarding "flags of convenience" vessels whose flag differs from the owner's nationality, vessels with unclear ownership structures, vessels behaving abnormally, and vessels lingering near sensitive infrastructure.
Lu also noted that Marles called for enhanced information sharing, improved vessel monitoring, legislative updates, and strengthened enforcement of port state legal powers. In response, Lu cautioned that leveraging Taiwan's experience and strengthening the protection of critical seabed infrastructure requires addressing the long-standing misinterpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758.
UNGA Resolution 2758 only resolves the issue of China's representation in the United Nations. The full text does not mention Taiwan, does not confirm Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China, and does not authorize the PRC to represent Taiwan within the UN system. However, it is often misused to restrict Taiwan's participation in international organizations and technical forums. Therefore, Lu pointed out that because Taiwan is excluded, it is difficult to share practical implementation knowledge with other countries, leading to governance gaps and institutional blind spots that can be exploited by hostile forces.
Lu also mentioned that Taiwan launched the "International Submarine Cable Risk Management Initiative" in October 2025, aiming to reduce the risk of related incidents and promote information sharing and institutional reform. This is particularly important for the AUKUS plan. The first major work of AUKUS's "Pillar Two" is precisely to develop advanced equipment to support unmanned underwater vehicles in order to enhance the protection of critical seabed infrastructure. Taiwan's years of experience in dealing with hostile countries' gray-zone activities perfectly complement the AUKUS plan. (Editor: Tang Peijun) 1150604
ASPI published Lu's article titled "The seabed is becoming a battlefield. Taiwan has field notes" on the 4th. The article mentions that Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles warned at the 2026 Asia Defense Summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, on May 30, stating that "the seabed will be a battlefield." Marles indicated that hostile nations, while attempting to damage critical seabed infrastructure of various countries, are also deliberately testing governments' response speeds, attribution thresholds for responsibility, and the political will to take countermeasures.
Lu stated that Taiwan has been continuously implementing related countermeasures since February 2023 and has accumulated rich practical experience. Taiwan has experience in identifying suspicious vessel behavior, monitoring vessels with tracking anomalies, and dealing with the limitations of existing maritime law enforcement tools.
Australia is currently working to enhance its ability to protect critical seabed infrastructure through the AUKUS trilateral security partnership. Lu urged Australia to recognize the value of learning from Taiwan's experience.
Lu emphasized that Australia needs to act quickly. Approximately 99% of Australia's internet traffic relies on just 15 submarine cables. These cables are the lifeline for Australia's financial services, healthcare systems, communication networks, and other economic sectors, yet they are difficult to protect and vulnerable to damage.
He stressed that Taiwan's experience is not theoretical. For example, on January 3, 2025, an international submarine cable in the waters north of Taiwan was cut, and Taiwanese authorities suspected a foreign-flagged cargo ship. The following month, a vessel flying the flag of Togo cut a cable connecting the main island of Taiwan and the Penghu archipelago. In June 2025, a Taiwanese court sentenced the Chinese captain of that vessel to three years in prison for intentionally damaging the submarine cable.
Lu pointed out that this verdict demonstrates Taiwan's accumulated investigative experience regarding "flags of convenience" vessels whose flag differs from the owner's nationality, vessels with unclear ownership structures, vessels behaving abnormally, and vessels lingering near sensitive infrastructure.
Lu also noted that Marles called for enhanced information sharing, improved vessel monitoring, legislative updates, and strengthened enforcement of port state legal powers. In response, Lu cautioned that leveraging Taiwan's experience and strengthening the protection of critical seabed infrastructure requires addressing the long-standing misinterpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758.
UNGA Resolution 2758 only resolves the issue of China's representation in the United Nations. The full text does not mention Taiwan, does not confirm Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China, and does not authorize the PRC to represent Taiwan within the UN system. However, it is often misused to restrict Taiwan's participation in international organizations and technical forums. Therefore, Lu pointed out that because Taiwan is excluded, it is difficult to share practical implementation knowledge with other countries, leading to governance gaps and institutional blind spots that can be exploited by hostile forces.
Lu also mentioned that Taiwan launched the "International Submarine Cable Risk Management Initiative" in October 2025, aiming to reduce the risk of related incidents and promote information sharing and institutional reform. This is particularly important for the AUKUS plan. The first major work of AUKUS's "Pillar Two" is precisely to develop advanced equipment to support unmanned underwater vehicles in order to enhance the protection of critical seabed infrastructure. Taiwan's years of experience in dealing with hostile countries' gray-zone activities perfectly complement the AUKUS plan. (Editor: Tang Peijun) 1150604
FAQ
When did Taiwan start its countermeasures for submarine cable protection?
Taiwan has been continuously implementing related countermeasures since February 2023.
What verdict did a Taiwanese court issue in a submarine cable damage case?
In June 2025, a Taiwanese court sentenced a Chinese captain to three years in prison for intentionally damaging a submarine cable.
What is AUKUS Pillar Two?
It is a project to develop advanced equipment to support unmanned underwater vehicles to enhance the protection of critical seabed infrastructure.