Taiwan to Set Up Deepfake Response Centers for Year-End Local Elections
Acting Prosecutor General Hsu Hsi-hsiang of the Supreme Prosecutors Office chaired a meeting on June 3, ordering all district prosecutors' offices to establish Major Disinformation Processing Centers for the year-end nine-in-one local elections. The Taipei District Prosecutors Office will handle major national deepfake cases. The meeting involved the Central Election Commission, Ministry of Digital Affairs, MJIB, CIB, and TWNIC to discuss procedures for identifying, removing, and clarifying deepfake disinformation.
📋 Article Processing Timeline
- 📰 Published: June 3, 2026 at 19:57
- 🔍 Collected: June 3, 2026 at 20:10 (13 min after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: June 6, 2026 at 16:30 (68h 19m after Collected)
(Central News Agency, Taipei, June 3) The Supreme Prosecutors Office held a meeting today. Acting Prosecutor General Hsu Hsi-hsiang directed that for the year-end nine-in-one local elections, all district prosecutors' offices shall establish Major Disinformation Processing Centers. These centers will handle the clarification and removal of major deepfake disinformation according to the reference procedures decided at the meeting.
The Supreme Prosecutors Office today convened a consultation meeting on the "Reference Procedures for Handling Deepfake and Disinformation Related to Election Interference Cases by Prosecutorial Authorities." Chaired by Hsu Hsi-hsiang, the meeting gathered the High Prosecutors Office, its branches, and the six special municipality district prosecutors' offices. Invited attendees included the Central Election Commission (CEC), the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB), the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB), and the Taiwan Network Information Center (TWNIC). They discussed procedures for identifying, removing, ceasing resolution, and clarifying deepfake disinformation related to the year-end elections.
Hsu directed that all district prosecutors' offices establish Major Disinformation Processing Centers, with the Taipei District Prosecutors Office handling major national deepfake disinformation cases. All district offices will follow the procedures proposed by the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office. Prosecutorial authorities may issue press clarifications as needed, notify platform operators for removal, or request the CIB under the National Police Agency to handle notifications for ceasing resolution.
The Supreme Prosecutors Office noted that according to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act, the primary subjects for applying for deepfake audio/video identification and requesting platform operators to restrict viewing, remove, or take down content are the parties involved, such as prospective candidates and candidates. They must pay for the identification themselves and may use the "Deepfake Audio/Video Infringement Removal Request Form" provided on the CEC's official website to request platform operators to take removal measures. The parties are the main entities for excluding such infringements.
The Supreme Prosecutors Office stated that prosecutors and judicial police officers handling deepfake disinformation cases can advise the parties to follow the aforementioned procedures, pay the required fees to the CIB for identification, and request operators to remove the content. The CEC has also created relevant flowcharts for law enforcement agencies to use when advising parties in such cases.
According to the press release, Hsu requested that the CIB and the MJIB enhance and master their deepfake audio/video identification capabilities, maintain close communication, and ensure rapid identification, swift collaborative investigation, and source tracing capabilities during the election period. (Editor: Chang Ya-ching) 1150603
The Supreme Prosecutors Office today convened a consultation meeting on the "Reference Procedures for Handling Deepfake and Disinformation Related to Election Interference Cases by Prosecutorial Authorities." Chaired by Hsu Hsi-hsiang, the meeting gathered the High Prosecutors Office, its branches, and the six special municipality district prosecutors' offices. Invited attendees included the Central Election Commission (CEC), the Ministry of Digital Affairs, the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB), the Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB), and the Taiwan Network Information Center (TWNIC). They discussed procedures for identifying, removing, ceasing resolution, and clarifying deepfake disinformation related to the year-end elections.
Hsu directed that all district prosecutors' offices establish Major Disinformation Processing Centers, with the Taipei District Prosecutors Office handling major national deepfake disinformation cases. All district offices will follow the procedures proposed by the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office. Prosecutorial authorities may issue press clarifications as needed, notify platform operators for removal, or request the CIB under the National Police Agency to handle notifications for ceasing resolution.
The Supreme Prosecutors Office noted that according to the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act, the primary subjects for applying for deepfake audio/video identification and requesting platform operators to restrict viewing, remove, or take down content are the parties involved, such as prospective candidates and candidates. They must pay for the identification themselves and may use the "Deepfake Audio/Video Infringement Removal Request Form" provided on the CEC's official website to request platform operators to take removal measures. The parties are the main entities for excluding such infringements.
The Supreme Prosecutors Office stated that prosecutors and judicial police officers handling deepfake disinformation cases can advise the parties to follow the aforementioned procedures, pay the required fees to the CIB for identification, and request operators to remove the content. The CEC has also created relevant flowcharts for law enforcement agencies to use when advising parties in such cases.
According to the press release, Hsu requested that the CIB and the MJIB enhance and master their deepfake audio/video identification capabilities, maintain close communication, and ensure rapid identification, swift collaborative investigation, and source tracing capabilities during the election period. (Editor: Chang Ya-ching) 1150603