Strategic Capital Announces Shareholder Proposal to Keihanshin Building and Launch of Special Website
Strategic Capital, holding approximately 11% of Keihanshin Building, has submitted a shareholder proposal for the June general meeting. The proposal urges the company to acquire shares from 35 policy-holding shareholders to improve governance and rectify a 37% valuation discount.
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- 📰 Published: April 28, 2026 at 00:30
- 🔍 Collected: April 27, 2026 at 16:01
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: April 28, 2026 at 00:17 (8h 15m after Collected)
Strategic Capital (the 'Proposer'), which holds approximately 11% of the shares of Keihanshin Building Co., Ltd. (the 'Company' or 'Keihanshin Building') together with the JAPAN-UP Fund, has exercised its right to make a shareholder proposal for the Company's Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders scheduled for June. The Proposer has also launched a special website (https://stracap.jp/8818-KEIHANSHIN/) to publicize this matter.
Summary of Proposed Agenda:
1. Acquisition of Treasury Stock from Specific Shareholders
(Summary) It is proposed that Keihanshin Building acquire its common stock as treasury stock from its policy-holding shareholders to terminate their holdings and improve corporate governance. The counterparties include 35 major Japanese companies and financial institutions such as Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Kajima Corporation, Kinden Corporation, and Sumitomo Life Insurance Company.
Background of the Proposal:
Problem (1): Management has allowed shareholder value to be continuously impaired. While Keihanshin Building's real estate leasing business generates stable income, it fails to achieve high returns exceeding capital costs. Consequently, its stock is valued at 92.3 billion yen despite an intrinsic asset value of 145.4 billion yen—a 37% discount.
Problem (2): Slow progress in management reforms to improve capital efficiency. Unlike competitors actively selling or liquidating holdings, Keihanshin Building has delayed its transition from an asset-holding business model.
Problem (3): Decline in management discipline due to policy-holding shareholders. Over 40% of outstanding shares are held by such shareholders, which may prevent proper oversight by general shareholders.
Problem (4): Lack of progress in stock sales by stable shareholders and concerns about pressure not to sell. Over the past five years, only one out of 21 disclosed policy-holding shareholders has sold Company stock, a trend the Proposer finds inexplicable and indicative of stagnant governance.
Summary of Proposed Agenda:
1. Acquisition of Treasury Stock from Specific Shareholders
(Summary) It is proposed that Keihanshin Building acquire its common stock as treasury stock from its policy-holding shareholders to terminate their holdings and improve corporate governance. The counterparties include 35 major Japanese companies and financial institutions such as Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Kajima Corporation, Kinden Corporation, and Sumitomo Life Insurance Company.
Background of the Proposal:
Problem (1): Management has allowed shareholder value to be continuously impaired. While Keihanshin Building's real estate leasing business generates stable income, it fails to achieve high returns exceeding capital costs. Consequently, its stock is valued at 92.3 billion yen despite an intrinsic asset value of 145.4 billion yen—a 37% discount.
Problem (2): Slow progress in management reforms to improve capital efficiency. Unlike competitors actively selling or liquidating holdings, Keihanshin Building has delayed its transition from an asset-holding business model.
Problem (3): Decline in management discipline due to policy-holding shareholders. Over 40% of outstanding shares are held by such shareholders, which may prevent proper oversight by general shareholders.
Problem (4): Lack of progress in stock sales by stable shareholders and concerns about pressure not to sell. Over the past five years, only one out of 21 disclosed policy-holding shareholders has sold Company stock, a trend the Proposer finds inexplicable and indicative of stagnant governance.