Cheng Li-wen's 'Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation' Statement: Scholar Says It Aligns with Xi Jinping
Taiwanese politician Cheng Li-wen met with Xi Jinping in Beijing and spoke of the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' A scholar, Wang Hong-ren, analyzed that this statement undermines Taiwan's democratic subjectivity and aligns with Xi Jinping's agenda. Cheng's interpretation of the '1992 Consensus' as 'opposing Taiwan independence' deviates from the KMT's traditional stance. Wang also noted the CCP's use of these narratives to boost the KMT's influence and undermine the DPP government's legitimacy.
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- 📰 Published: April 10, 2026 at 22:39
- 🔍 Collected: April 11, 2026 at 00:17 (1h 38m after Published)
- 🤖 AI Analyzed: April 15, 2026 at 19:21 (115h 4m after Collected)
Cheng Li-wen met with Xi Jinping at the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing at 11 AM today and both delivered public speeches.
Wang Hong-ren, in an interview with CNA, pointed out that the content of the Cheng-Xi meeting was largely as expected, with both sides' scripts and lines already coordinated. He believes the key point is that this trip was positioned as a 'journey of peace,' intending to draw a strong contrast with the DPP's 'resist China and protect Taiwan' agenda.
Wang Hong-ren noted that in the definition of the '1992 Consensus,' Cheng Li-wen has departed from the KMT's traditional definition. The '1992 Consensus' is no longer about 'one China, respective interpretations,' but rather 'opposing Taiwan independence,' making 'opposing Taiwan independence' the political foundation for cross-strait relations. Since the DPP and the Communist Party lack this foundation, contact is impossible.
He said that what was unexpected was that 'Cheng Li-wen seemed even more eager for unification than Xi Jinping,' especially her clear mention of hoping to 'institutionalize' the achievements of this peace journey. This carries a strong implication: 'The KMT is not the ruling party; what is the intention of discussing this with them (the CCP) and institutionalizing it?'
Wang Hong-ren stated that another unexpected point was Cheng Li-wen's mention that 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the common rejuvenation of people on both sides of the strait.' This discourse 'completely reversed' the subjectivity established during Taiwan's democratization process, reverting to the KMT's earliest discourse, which 'clearly aligns with Xi Jinping.'
He believes Cheng Li-wen's speech made 'significant concessions.' While she mentioned the Republic of China at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, at the Cheng-Xi meeting, she spoke of the 'overall interests of the Chinese nation,' causing the subjectivity of the Republic of China, which the KMT originally hoped to secure, to disappear.
Regarding Cheng Li-wen's stated directions for effort at the press conference, such as promoting common well-being and fostering exchanges and cooperation, Wang Hong-ren pointed out that many Taiwanese people would certainly agree. However, the question is how to achieve this. Is it necessary to first agree to the political preconditions of the other side to conditionally achieve cross-strait welfare? This is the part she did not address. 'In fact, she did not directly discuss many of the underlying concerns with the other side.'
Secondly, Wang Hong-ren noted that Cheng Li-wen also mentioned increasing Taiwan's international space, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and promoting mutual benefit across the strait. Everyone agrees with these points, but they all require a cross-strait consultation mechanism, which has long been advocated by the ruling party, but the other side has not responded.
He said that the CCP is now cooperating with these narratives, 'hoping to increase the KMT's bargaining chips within Taiwan and to undermine the legitimacy of the DPP's governance,' but these are not substantively achievable.
Wang Hong-ren emphasized that everyone believes peace is good, but peace cannot be based on illusions, nor can it solely rely on the other side. Taiwan still needs its own defense capabilities. He added that it remains to be seen how the KMT will approach the arms sales case after Cheng Li-wen's return to Taiwan. (Edited by Chiu Kuo-chiang) 1150410
Wang Hong-ren, in an interview with CNA, pointed out that the content of the Cheng-Xi meeting was largely as expected, with both sides' scripts and lines already coordinated. He believes the key point is that this trip was positioned as a 'journey of peace,' intending to draw a strong contrast with the DPP's 'resist China and protect Taiwan' agenda.
Wang Hong-ren noted that in the definition of the '1992 Consensus,' Cheng Li-wen has departed from the KMT's traditional definition. The '1992 Consensus' is no longer about 'one China, respective interpretations,' but rather 'opposing Taiwan independence,' making 'opposing Taiwan independence' the political foundation for cross-strait relations. Since the DPP and the Communist Party lack this foundation, contact is impossible.
He said that what was unexpected was that 'Cheng Li-wen seemed even more eager for unification than Xi Jinping,' especially her clear mention of hoping to 'institutionalize' the achievements of this peace journey. This carries a strong implication: 'The KMT is not the ruling party; what is the intention of discussing this with them (the CCP) and institutionalizing it?'
Wang Hong-ren stated that another unexpected point was Cheng Li-wen's mention that 'the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the common rejuvenation of people on both sides of the strait.' This discourse 'completely reversed' the subjectivity established during Taiwan's democratization process, reverting to the KMT's earliest discourse, which 'clearly aligns with Xi Jinping.'
He believes Cheng Li-wen's speech made 'significant concessions.' While she mentioned the Republic of China at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, at the Cheng-Xi meeting, she spoke of the 'overall interests of the Chinese nation,' causing the subjectivity of the Republic of China, which the KMT originally hoped to secure, to disappear.
Regarding Cheng Li-wen's stated directions for effort at the press conference, such as promoting common well-being and fostering exchanges and cooperation, Wang Hong-ren pointed out that many Taiwanese people would certainly agree. However, the question is how to achieve this. Is it necessary to first agree to the political preconditions of the other side to conditionally achieve cross-strait welfare? This is the part she did not address. 'In fact, she did not directly discuss many of the underlying concerns with the other side.'
Secondly, Wang Hong-ren noted that Cheng Li-wen also mentioned increasing Taiwan's international space, maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and promoting mutual benefit across the strait. Everyone agrees with these points, but they all require a cross-strait consultation mechanism, which has long been advocated by the ruling party, but the other side has not responded.
He said that the CCP is now cooperating with these narratives, 'hoping to increase the KMT's bargaining chips within Taiwan and to undermine the legitimacy of the DPP's governance,' but these are not substantively achievable.
Wang Hong-ren emphasized that everyone believes peace is good, but peace cannot be based on illusions, nor can it solely rely on the other side. Taiwan still needs its own defense capabilities. He added that it remains to be seen how the KMT will approach the arms sales case after Cheng Li-wen's return to Taiwan. (Edited by Chiu Kuo-chiang) 1150410